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Abstract
Verification of integrity and authenticity of information is a prime requirement in
computer networks. In open networks such as the Internet, a strong mechanism to provide
these security services is essential. With the introduction of Internet Protocol Security
(IPSEC), the need has arisen to have a simple, efficient and widely available Message
Authentication Code (MAC) mechanism. The standard approach for message
authentication in Internet applications has been based on the use of cryptographic hash
functions such as Secure Hash Algorithm·l (SHA.l) and Message Digest 5 (MDS). The
wide availability of software implementations, efficiency in software and freedom of
license and export restrictions are some of the reasons for adoption of hash-based MACs
or HM:ACs. In high-speed network applications hardware encryption and authentication
have become essential to meet the perfonnance requirements. Field Progranunable Gate
Arrays (FPGAs) are an attractive option because they are capable of providing the
required speed, algorithm agility and flexibility of dynamic system evolution. When these
factors are considered, FPGA devices are a promising alternative for implementing
cryptograpruc algorithms.
In this research, FPGA implementations of MD5, SHA-I and HMAC using SHA-
I as the basis hash algorithm have been carried out. MD5 and SHA-I have been
implemented using an iterative and full loop unrolled architectures. The target device has
been selected as the XILINX Virtex series FPGA. Performance analysis in tenns of
hardware utilization and speed are executed. Different design optimization techniques are
also discussed.
The Internet is one of the main areas of application of cryptographic hash
functions and the size of the message has a considerable impact on the perfonnance of
these algorithms. Hence the performance of HMAC both in hardware and software are
investigated using four Internet traffic models. The same analysis is performed on CBC-
MAC-AES for perfonnance comparison.
Due to the sequential nature of the structure of these algorithms, it is difficult to
make them fast enough to ensure suitability for very high-speed applications. Therefore
some alternative methods have to be investigated for high-speed applications. One of the
proposed algorithms based on universal hashing, the Universal Message Authentication
Code (UMAC), is analyzed for its hardware perfonnance. Finally the conclusion and
recommendations for future research are presented.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The significance of information and communications systems for society and the
global economy is intensifying with the increasing value and quantity of data that is
transmitted and stored on those systems. At the same time those systems and data are also
increasingly vulnerable to a variety of threats, such as unauthorized access and use,
embezzlement, modification and destruction. As well. the system vulnerability has been
increased due to proliferation of computers. increased computer power, imcrconnectivity,
decentralization, growth of networks and number of users and also the convergence of
information and conununications technologies.
Cryptology is the tenn which describes the whole meaning of secret
communications. This has been originated from the Greek meanings "hidden" and
"word". Cryptology can be divided into two subfields: cryptography and cryptanalysis
[1]. The cryptographer finds the ways to ensure secrecy and/or authenticity of messages.
The cryptanalyst seeks to break that secrecy and/or authenticity by attacking a cipher or
by forging coded signals that would be accepted as authentic. Cryptography is an
important component of secure communications systems and a variety of applications
have been developed mat incorporate cryptographic methods to provide dala security.
Security of infonnation and communications systems involves me assurance of me
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability of those systems and the data that is
transmitted and stored on them.
The widespread use of cryptography raises a number of important issues.
Governments have many services engaged in the use of cryptography, including
protecting the privacy rights of peopLe and organizations, facilitating infonnation and
communications systems security, encouraging economic well-being by, in part,
promoting eLectronic commerce, maintaining public safety, enabling the enforcement of
laws and the protection of national security, among others. Traditionally, cryptography
was most often used by governments. However in recent years cryptography has become
an important issue among individuals and businesses as it has become more accessible
and more affordable [2]. The explosive growth in computer systems and their
interconnections via networks have greatly influenced today's human life. The storing
and communicating of infonnation using these systems have become an essential part of
our lives. As a result there is a growing awareness of the necessity for information
security.
In infonnation security, message authentication and integrity are essential
techniques to verify that received messages come from the alleged source and have not
been altered during the transit. These techniques may also be useful to verify sequencing,
timeliness and to provide non-repudiation. A key element of authentication schemes is
the use of a message authentication code (MAC). One technique to produce a MAC is
based on using a cryptographic hash function, which is referred to as Hash based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [3]. The most popular cryptographic hash
functions are the Message Digest 5 (MD5) [3J, which was proposed by Ron Rivest, and
the Secure Hash A1gorithm-1 (SHA-I), which has been certified by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST).
There is a high demand for high quality products and expertise in the field of
information security. Recently very high bandwidth networking technologies such as
ATM and Gigabit Ethernet are becoming more prevalent. Network applications such as
virtual private networks (VPNs) need high-speed cryptographic algorithms to match these
new high-speed networks [5].
1.1 Motivation
Internet Protocol Security (lPSEC) [6] is one of the key security standards that
provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security
protocols, detennine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s), and put in place any
cryptographic keys required to provide the requested services (6]. IPSEC offers a secure
communications across Local Area Networks (LANs), private and public Wide Area
Networks (WANs) and the Internet. By employing IPSEC tunnel mode operation, a
company can build a secure VPN over the Internet or through a public WAN [7]. lPSEC
provides an open framework for implementing industry-standard algorithms. The
algorithms employed for MAC value calculation are specified by the security association
(SA). Keyed message authentication codes based on symmetric encryption algoritluns or
one-way hash functions such as MD5 [4] or SHA·l [8] have roth been specified for
authentication. IPSEC implementations must support hash based message authentication
codes with MD5 (HMAC-MD5-96) [9] and SHA-l (HMAC-SHA-I-96) (10). The
algorithm details and the issues in hardware implementation of MD5, SHA-l and
HMAC-SHA-l are discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 respectively.
In all these applications the perfonnance of IPSEC processing is a crucial issue as
cryptographic operations, in general, cause a botl.leneck for a processor. In high-speed
routers and other networking equipment that apply lPSEC to aggregated traffic, hardware
encryption and authentication is almost essential to meet perfonnance objectives [11].
For some applications such equipment may have to handle a large number of security
associations and hence key agility and algorithm agility become important issues. There
is an increasing interest in high-speed cryptographic accelerators for IPSEC applications
such as VPNs. Most of the available produces are microprocessor based cryptographic
accelerators. They accelerate the computationally imensive algorithms of encryption and
authemication. Hence the study of the perfonnance of hardware implementation of
cryptographic algorithms, especially using programmable logic devices such as Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), has become a timely and important field of
research.
1.2 Objective of the Thesis
The objective of the thesis is the performance analysis of the hardware
implememalion of the authemication algorithms which are widely used in Internet
pro[QCol security. The hardware utilization and timing analysis with respect to a high-end
field programmable gate array device are studied using several possible optimization
techniques. The potential throughputs of the implementations are analyzed in the context
of traffic characteristics of the Internet. This is done using four traffic models which have
different degrees of accuracy.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis consists of 7 chapters. Chapter 2 gives the background of the research
and the literature review of the previous research, which are related to this slUdy. Chapter
3 discusses the design environment and implementation choices, which are used for the
research. The implementation details and results are discussed in Chapler 4. In Chapter 5
the Internel traffic modeling thai was used 10 analyze HMAC aJgorithm is discussed. The
new approach in message authentication is discussed in Chapter 6. Finally in Chapter 7,
conclusions and future work are presented.
Chapter 2
Background of Study and Previous Research
In this chapter the background of the research and some of the key areas of
application are discussed. Hash algorithms are widely used in Internet security to provide
message authentication. In fact the Internet has become one of the main areas of
application of cryptographic hash algorithms. Hence at the beginning of the chapter, the
protocol used in Internct security is briefly described. Various studies have been carried
Ollt in the areas of cryplOgraphic hash functions, message authentication codes and
hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Some of these studies are
discussed in the subsequent chapters.
2.1 Internet Protocol Security (lPSEC)
IPSEC [6} is onc of the key technologies for providing security as a foundation
network service [12]. It is the security standard defined by Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) for IF network layer security. Acconling to [6J. IPSEC provides security
services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security protocols,
determine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s), and put in place a cryptographic
technique to provide the requested services. The key services used to protect against the
threats are confidentiality, integrity and authentication. IPSEC allows for end·to-end
encryption and authentication making TCPIIP communications secure for use in both
public and private networks. The IP layer of the TCP!IP protocol architecture has been
chosen as a place 10 operate lPSEC.
The securily services offered by IPSEC include access control, connectionless
integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays, confidentiality and limited
flow confidentiality. These services are provided at the IP layer offering protection for IP
and lor upper layer protocols such as TCP, UDP, ICMP and so on. These objectives are
achieved through the use of two traffic security protocols - the Authentication Header
(AH) [13) and the EncapSUlating Security Protocol (ESP) [6) - and through the use of
cryptographic key managemenl procedures and protocols. AH provides connectionless
integrity, data authentication and anti-replay services. ESP provides confidentiality,
limited traffic flow confidentialily and/or connectionless integrity. It optionally provides
data authentication and anti-replay services as well [6]. Both AH and ESP provide access
control based on the distribution of cryptographic keys and management of traffic flows
relative to these security protocols. Both may be applied alone or in combination with
each other 10 provide a desired set of services in lntemet standards, IPv4 [14] and IPv6
[151.
2.1.1 Security Associations (SA)
This is a key concept fundamental to lPSEC. An SA is a one-way relationship
belween a sender and a receiver that affords security services to the traffic carried [16).
This is uniquely identified by a triple consisting of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), the
IP destination address and the security protocol (AHlESP) identifier. Each IP$EC
connection can provide encryption and integrity/authentication, or both. When the
security service is detennined, the twO parties must detennine which algorithms to use
(e.g. DES or IDEA for encryption; MD5 or SHA~1 for authentication) [12]. Then mey
must share session keys. SAs are used to manage this information. To ensure
interoperability and for providing management capability, some eXlernal aspeclS of
IPSEC processing are slandardized. Hence a nominal model has been described in tenns
of two databases: !he Securily Policy Database (SPD) and Security Association Database
(SAD) [6]. The former specifies the policies that delermine the disposition of all IP traffic
inbound or outbound from a host or security gateway IP implementation. The latter
database contains paramelers mat are associated with each security association.
2.1.2 IPSEC Packets
lPSEC defines a new set of headers 10 be added to IP datagrams: LP
Authentication Header (AM) [13) and LP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [17).
These new headers are placed after the IP header and before the layer 4 prolocol (TCP or
UDP). These two can be used in two modes: transport and tunnel modes. In transport
mode the protocols provide protection mainly for upper layer protocols. Hence the
protection eXlends to the IP payload. In tunnel mode me protocols are applied to tunneled
IP packets, which become the payload in a new IF packet
Authentication Header (AH)
The AH format is given in Figure I (13].
SilO BitS Bit 16 Bit 31
N.~ I Payload I
header length
S&clJrity Parameter Indell (SPI)
8eqlJElnce Number
AuthenticatiollOala
(MAC/ICV)
(VariabJelength)
Figure 1. IPSEC Authentication Header Format
This header when added to an IP datagram ensures connectionless integrity and
authenticity of the data and optionally protection against replays. This enables an end
system or network devi~ to authenticate the user or application and filter traffic
accordingly. It prevents the address spoofing attacks as well. In this format the next
header identifies the type of the next payload aftef authentication header. Payload length
specifies the length of AH in 32-bit words minus 2. SPI is used to identify the SA for the
datagram. Sequence number can be used as an anti replay service. Authentication data is
a variable length field that contains the MAC or Integrity Check Value (ICV) fOf this
packet. This field must be a multiple of 32·bits in length. The ICV or MAC value is
computed as a function of the IP datagram and the secret authentication keying material,
which is part of the SA. Only the sender and receiver know the secret keying material. If
the authentication value is valid the data has come from the other party of the SA (6J.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
ESP provides confidentiality and integrity services to IP datagrarns. It may also
provide limited traffic flow confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless
integrity and anti replay-service for IP datagrams depending upon the implementation
and header use mode (tunnel or transpon). Limited traffic flow confidentiality requires
selection of tunnel mode, and the encryption occurs only between an external host and
the security gateway or between two security gateways. This relieves the hosts on the
internal network of the processing burden of encryption and simplifies the key
distribution task by reducing the number of keys. Hence it thwarts traffic analysis based
on ultimate destination. The set of services provided depends on options selected.
Confidentiality may be selected independent of all other services but the use of
confidentiality without integrity/authentication may be subject to cenain fonns of active
attacks. Data origin authentication and connectionless integrity are joint services and are
offered as optional services. The anti replay-service may be selected only if data origin
authentication is selected. The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before the
upper layer protocol header (transpon mode) or before an encapsulated IP header (tunnel
mode). The ESP header format is given in Figure 2. Most of the fields have similar
purposes as mentioned under AH, The payload data is a variable field, which is the
transpon level segment or IP packet protected by encryption. The padding field is used to
expand the plaintext, to conceal the actual length, or for any other alignments required by
the ESP fonnat. The Authentication Data is a variable length field that gives the MAC
computed over the ESP packet minus the authentication data field.
10
BiIO
Security Parameter In<lex (SPI)
Seq\IerlceNumber
Payload (Variable)
I Padciog (0·255 byles)
I Padlength I' ext
AutheotleatlonData IVarlable\
31
Figure 2. IPSEC ESP header fonnat
2.2 Hash Functions
Some important algorilhms and techniques resulting from various studies related
10 hash functions and message authentication codes are discussed in the following
sections.
2.2.1 Properties of Hash Functions
A hash function is a malhematical function that maps values from a large (or very
large) domain into a smaller range, and that reduces a potentially long message into a
"message digest~ or ~hash value". It provides a fast method of storing infonnation in and
retrieving from large databases. Hash functions are used in implementing associative
memories and error correction as well. With the advent of public key cryptography and
digital signature schemes, cryptographic hash functions have gained more attention in
11
their role of providing aothenticity for a message. A "good" hash function is one that
results in a set of values that are evenly (and randomly) distributed over Ihe range [181. In
order to avoid !he possible attacks, a hash function used for cryptographic purposes
should have several propenies [191:
Weakly collision-free: Let M be a message. A hash function H is weakly
collision-free for M if it is computationally infeasible to find a message M':f' M
such that H (M) '" H (M).
Strongly collision free: A hash function H is strongly collision-free if it is
computationally infeasible to find messages M and M'such that M'':f' M and H (M')
=H(M).
One-way property: A hash function is one-way if, given a message digest Z, it is
computationally infeasible to find a message M such that H (M) ::: Z
The input can be of any lengm and output has a fixed length.
The hash function H is relatively easy to compUle for any given M.
2.2.2 Digital Signatures
W~ now briefly describe one of me principle cryptographic applications of hash
functions. Sometimes it is required to verify the origin of a document, the identity of the
sender. the time and date a documeot was sent and/or signed, me identity of a computer
or user, and so on. A digital signature is a cryptographic means through which many of
these may, be verified. The digital signature can be computed using the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) {20] and a set of parameters such that the identity of me signatory and
12
integrity of the dara can be verified. The DSA provides the capability to generate and
verify signatures. Signature generation makes use of a private key to generate a digital
signature. Signature verification makes use of a public key, which is related to, but is not
the same as, the private key. Each user possesses a private aDd public key pair. In general
public keys are assumed to be known to the public. Private keys are never shared.
Anyone can verify the signature of a user by employing that user's public key. Signature
generation can be performed only by the possessor of the user's private key. A
cryptographic hash function is used in the signatUre generation process to obtain a
compressed version of dara, called a message digest (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Cryptographic hash functions in digital signature scheme
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The message digest is then input to the DSA to generate the digital signature. The digital
signature is sent to the intended verifier along with the signed data (often called the
message). The verifier of the message and signature verifies the signature by using the
sender's public key. The same hash function must also be used in the verification process
[21).
2.2.3 General Approaches to Hash Function Construction
Many researchers have discovered a number of teelutiques to develop hash
functions. We now describe some of the approaches of constnlcting hash functions.
Hash runction based 00 block ciphers
This is an effort to build hash functions on the existing block ciphers rather than
coosuucting them from scratch. The encryption of plaintext X with key K will be denoted
with E (K. X). The size or the plaintext and ciphertext in bits is denoted. with n and the
size of the key size in bits is denoted with k.. The argument of the iterated hash function is
divided into r blocks Xl through X" If the total length is not a multiple of n, the argument
has to be padded with some accepted padding rule. If the round function is denoted by f,
the hash function H can be described as follows:
Hi=f(X~H;.l) i = 1,2.... r.
where, Ho is Initial Value (lV). specified with the scheme and H, represents the hash
'ode.
The general construction for the round function of the hash functions is shown in
Figure 4. For simplicity it is assumed that k = n. The block cipher has two inputs; the key
K and the plaintext P and the output C. The inputs P and K can be selected. from one of
14
the four values: XI> HI.], XI EJ1 HI.], and a constant value V. It is also possible to modify
with feed forwarding (FF) the output C by XQR of one of these values. Preneel shows
that these possibilities yield 43 = 64 different schemes [22]. He also shows that, only 12
oflhese schemc:s are secure.
~. ~
1- IK -I FF
Figure 4. General model for round function of block cipher based hash function
Hash functions based on modular arithmetic
Two important hard problems in number theory, factorization and the discrete
logarithm, are used to build these hash functions. These can have variable digest length
depending on the size of the modulus [23J. The purpose of deploying modular arithmetic
is to save on implementation cost by using existing cryptographic systems such as RSA
public key cryptosystem [24J. Due to their various weaknesses, these kinds of hash
functions are not popular in today's cryptographic applications.
Dedicated Hash Functions
While many hash functions are based on existing security mechanisms such as
block ciphers or modular schemes, performance critical applications require the use of
15
functions designed for explicit use of hashing. These are called dedicated or customized
hash functions (25). Dedicated hash functions tend to be fast, achieving a considerable
advantage over algorithms that are based on other techniques. These hash functions are
not provably secure, as they are not based on a hard problem such as factorization. But
most of them are computationally secure. Message Digest (MD)-family hash functions
fall into this category, which were proposed by RSA Data Security Inc. These are
iterative hash functions based on a compression function with fixed size input. The
compression function consists of operations such as modular 2]2 addition, rotation and
permutation, which can be easily performed either in software or hardware. MD4 [26] is
an early example of a popular hash function with such a dedicated design. Although MD4
is no longer considered secure for most cryptographic applications, most new dedicated
hash functions make use of the same design principles as MD4 in strengthened versions.
Their suength varies depending on the techniques, or combinations of techniques,
employed in their design. Some of the popular dedicated hash functions in current use
include MD5, SHA-l, RIPEMD-I60 and HAVAL.
Other Approaches
Hash functions based on the Knapsack problem and Cellular Automata are some
other approaches. Since hash functions never have to be inverted, completely random
generated knapsacks can be used for their construction. Two examples of the hash
functions based on the Knapsack problem are hash functions based on additive knapsacks
and multiplicative knapsacks. [27} But it has been proven that these can be broken [28].
16
Wolfram has suggested a random sequence generator using cellular automata [29]. Using
this pseudo random generator Daeman et al. suggested a hash function called "cellhash"
(30] in which the hash result of a message M of length n is computed in two phases. In
the first phase the message is extended with minimum number of zeros so that its length
in bits is at least 248 or congruent to 24 mod 23. Let the resulting message be Mo,
MI ...MN_1each of 32-bit words. Then in the second phase the hash function F«H, A) is
applied. The hash function F.(H, A) is a function with argument H, a bit string of length
257 and A, a bit string of length 256. It returns a bit string of length 257. Initial value (IV)
is the all-zero bit string of length 257. The computation involves detennining values for
ff=F.(Hj·I,Mj.IM)ModH... Mj+6modN),j=1 ...N
where If = Nand iI' is the 257-bit hash result.
This is a hash function suitable for hardware implementations. TIle core is made
up of two cellular automata operations and pennutations. In this algorithm the diffusion
and confusion properties have been obtained by linear cellular automaton and non-linear
aUiomaton respectively.
F.(H. A) has five step-transformation of H. Let ho, hi ......h2$6 denote the bits of
Hand ao. al .. .. .am represent the bits of A.
Stepl:h/=hi G1(hl+1 vh;:;) OSi<257
Step2: 110 ="h; O:Si<ZS7
I7
O~i<257
0:5i<257
where EEl, v and -represent KOR, OR and NOT operations respectively.
2.2.4 Message Digest 5 (MDS)
MD5 [41 is a message digest algorithm developed by Ron Rivest at MIT. It is
basically a secure version of his previous algorithm, MD4 which is a little faster than
MD5. This has been the most widely used secure hash algorithm particularly in Intemet-
standard message authentication. The algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary
length and produces as output a 128-bit message digcst of the input. This is mainly
intended for digital signature applications where a large file must be compressed in a
secure manner before being encrypted with a private (secret) key under a public key
cryptosystem.
Assume we have an arbitrarily large message as input and that we wish to fmd its
message digest. The processing involves the following steps.
(I) Padding
The message is padded to ensure that its length in bits plus 64 is divisible by 512, that is,
its length is congruent to 448 modulo 512. Padding is always performed even if the
length of the message is already congruent to 448 modulo 512. Padding consists of a
single I-bit followed by the necessary number of o-bits.
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(2) Appending length
A 64·bil binary represemation of the original length of the message is concatenated to the
result of step (I). (Least significant byte first). The expanded message at this level will
exactly be a multiple of 512-bils. Let the expanded message be represented as a sequence
of L 5l2-bit blocks Yo. Yl. ... Yq.... YL,.J as shown in Figure 5 [16]. Note that in the figure, IV
and CV represent the initial value and chaining variable, respectively.
PaldiI1g(1,SI2l1llsj
+--+ +--+ +--+ +--+
~. "..%...~.,128 128 \28 128t'oa t'oa Hta Hta ,--PJ 01. OI~,
Figure 5. Generation of message digest
(3) Initialize the MD buffer
The variables IV and CV are both represented by a four-word buffer (ABCD) used [()
compute the message digest. Here each of A, B, CandO is a 32·bit register and they are
initialized as IV to the following values in hexadecimal. Low-order bytes are put first.
Word A: 01 23 45 67
Word B: 89 AB CD EF
Word C: FE DC BA 98
Word 0: 76 54 32 to
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(4) Process message in t6-word blocks
This is the hean of the algorithm, which includes four "rounds" of processing. It is
represented by HMOS in Figure 5 and its logic is given in Figure 6. The four rounds have
similar structure but each uses different auxiliary functions F, G, Hand T.
F(X,Y,Z)",(X AY)V(X AY)
G(X,Y,Z) .. (X AZ)V(Y AZ)
H(X,Y,Z)=X$Y$Z
I(X,Y,Z)-Ye(xv"Z)
where, V, A, $ and - represent the logical OR, AND, XOR and NOT operations,
respectively. Each round consists of 16 steps and each step uses a 64-element table T [1
... 64] constructed from the sine function. Let 1'[11 denote the i-th element of the table,
which is equal to the integer part of 2J2 times abs(sin(I)), where j is in radians. The value j
represents the step number. Each round also takes as input the current 512-bit block (Y,)
and the 128-bit chaining variable (CV,). An array X of 32-bit words holds the current 512-
bit Y,. For the first round the words are used in their original order. The following
pennutations of the words are defined for rounds 2 through 4;
P2(1) = (I+ 50 mod 16
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In Figure 6, Jctp,(~l, Jctp.zm .lqp,(~l and .xtPo(~1 represent 16 words of x, pennuted according
to Pl(i), P2(1), P3(i) and p4(i) respectively.
CV.
Figure 6. Compression function HMDS
The output of the fourth round is added to lhe input of the fint round (CV,) to produce
CV,+/.
(5) Output
After all L 512-bit blocks have been processed,lhe output from lhe Llh stage is lhe 12S·bit
message digest.
Figure 7 shows the operations involved in a single step [161. The additions are
perfonned as modulo 232 operations. Four different circular shift amounts (5) are used
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each round and these are different from round to round. Here ~kl represents the
corresponding word for the step according to the pennutation rule mentioned earlier.
Figure 7. Operations in a single step of MD5
The operation of a step can be represented mathematically as follows:
A~D
B +- B +({A +FUIIC(B,C,D) +X(t}+ T[iJ)« S)
C~B
D~C
2.2.5 Secure Hasb Algoritbm-! (SHA·!)
SHA-l is the algorithm specified in the Secure Hash Standard (81. which was
developed by NIST. When a message of any length < i '4 bits is input, SHA-l produces a
160·bit output as a message digest. The overall processing of a message follows the MD5
structure given in Figure 5 with HM05 and the hash I chaining variable lengths replaced
with Hsw..[ and 160 bits, respectively. The processing consists of following five steps.
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(1) Padding
The message is padded to ensure that its length in bits plus 64 is divisible by 512. That is,
its length is congruent to 448 modulo 512. Padding is always performed even if the
length of the message is already congruent to 448 modulo 512. Padding consists of a
single I-bit followed by the necessary number of D-bits.
(2) Appending length
A 64-bit binary representation of the original length of the message is concatenated to the
result of step (I). (Most significant byte first). The expanded message at this level will
exactly be a multiple of 512-bits. Let the expanded message be represented as a sequence
of L 512-bit blocks Yo. Y1.... Yq....YL,.1 as shown in Figure 5 [16].
(3) Initialize
The variables IV and CV are represented by a five-word buffer (ABCDE) used to compute
the message digest. Here each of A, B, C, 0 and E is a 32-bit register and liley are
initialized as IV to the following values in hexadecimal. These values are stored in big-
endian format, which has the most significant byte of a word in the low-address byte
position.
A: 67452301
B: EFCDAB89
C: 98BADCFE
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CVq ~ 160
0: 10325476
E: C3D2ElFO
(4) Process message in 16-word blocks
As in MD5, Ihis is the heart of the algorithm, which includes four "rounds" of processing
and its logic is given in Figure 8. Each round has 20 steps.
y.
!'i12 J..A R J, r. n J, F
-Jii Ft, K~ W[O..19j20stops I
~ F2,Kt.W[20..39]20stops I
-J FS,K,WI,"..'.]20""" I
----.I F4,K,WI60··79)20""" I
A iW B C
160
Figure 8. Compression Function HsRA-1
The four primitive functions are,
FJ(X,Y,Z) =(X AY)V(X AY)
F2(X,Y,Z);XeYeZ
F3(X,Y,Z) =(Y Ay)V(X AZ)V(Y AZ)
F4(X,Y,Z)=XffiYlBZ
The four rounds have similar slrUcture but each uses different auxiliary functions F1
(steps 0 S; t S; 19), F2 (steps 20 S; t S; 39), F3 (steps 40 S t S; 59), and F4 (steps 60 S t :s;
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79). Each round utilizes an additive constant 1(" where 0 ~ t ~ 79 indicates the step.
Unlike MDS, SHA·l uses only four distinct constants. The constants in hexadecimal arc
as follows.
...., K, in Hexadecimal
OS'S 19 KFSA827999
20:5t~39 Kr=6ED9EBAJ
4OSt~59 K,=8FIBBCDC
6OS1S79 K,-cA62CID6
Each round also takes as input the current 512-bit block (Y,) and the 160-bit chaining
variable (CV.). Then CV, is updated through the four rounds and the output of the fourth
round (801ll step) is added to the input to the first round to produce CV<J+l' This addition is
done independently for each of the five words in the buffer with each of the
corresponding words in CVQ using modulo 232•
(4) Output;
When all the blocks have been processed, the 160-bit output will be the message digest.
The generic step oCthe compression function is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Operations in a single step of SHA·l
The operations in a step can be represented in mathematical form as follows.
At- E+F(B.C,D)+SS(A)+W, +K/
B~'
Ct-S 30 (B)
D~C
E~D
Here, A, B, C, D and E are five words of the input buffer. S' denoleS the circular left shift
of the 32·bit argument by n bits. K, is the additive constant for step t. W, represents 32·bit
word derived from the current 512·bit inpul block. All additions (+) are modulo 232
additions.
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2.3 Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
Message authentication is the procedure to verify that received messages come
from the alleged source and have not been a(ccrcd. A MAC is an authentication tag
(checksum) derived by applying an authentication scheme, together with a secret key, to
a message so that the recipient can verify the message authenticity. There are several
types of construction available to produce MACs. These include
(a) Block cipher based MACs
(b) Keyed hash function based MACs
(c) Universal hash function based MACs.
In our work we have focused on the important technique of combining a key with an
unkeyed hash function. referred to as HMAC which is of type (b). Apart from these
methods there are other techniques as well. Unconditionally secure MACs [19] based on
encryption with a one-time pad and stteam cipher based MACs [311 are other examples.
A MAC is said to be secure if it can resist existential forgery under an adaptive chosen-
message attack [32].
2.3.1 Block Cipher Based MACs
Cipher Block Chaining MACs (CBC·MACs)
This is the most widely used MAC, frrst used in the mid 1970s. A block cipher is
used in Cipher Block Chaining mode as shown in Figure 10. Let a message space for M
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be binary strings whose lengths are a positive multiple of I. Hence the message M can be
broken into blocks such that
Then each block is passed through the encryption E with key K and the result is XORed
with the next block. EK represents the encryption using a key K. Cipher block chaining is
given by
where, d indicates I bit vector of all zeros.
{(" MACK E
Figure 10. CBC-MAC
The standards ANSI X9.9 [33] and FIPS 113 (34] describe CBC-MAC. Although it was
proven secure for fixed length messages by Bellare et al. [35], CBC·MAC does not
directly give a method to authenticate messages of variable lengths. If the length of
strings varies from a multiple of block length. me CBC-MAC becomes more vulnerable.
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Bdlare suggested three methods: input-length key separation, length prepending and
encrypting lasl block to overcome that vulnerability [32J.
XORMACs
This is an approach for aUlhenticating a message using a Finite Pseudo Random
Function (PRF). This PRF can be inslantiated with a block cipher or a compression
funClion of a cryplographic hash function. The advantages of this are parallelizabilily,
incrementability and provable security. There are three main steps in this algorithm [36).
1. Encode message M as a collection of blocks.
2. Apply the finite PRF to each block creating collection of PRF images.
3. XOR the set ofPRF images together.
XOR MAC has two schemes namely, randomized and counter based. In the randomized
scheme, it is assured that there is a PRF F with input size I, output size L and key length k
bits. A parameter b is fixed where b < I, wlllch is the block size. Assume the message to
be authenticated M bas length at most b x 2'+1. By slandard padding arguments we may
assume that the message is a multiple of b. Usually b is taken as In. So
M=Ml,M2,."Mn
where IM,1 = b. Let <i >denote the binary representation of the J·b-l bit encoding of the
integer i. It is the binary representation of the block index i e {f,2•.. ,nl.
Assume Ke {a, lItis the shared key oflengthk. To compute the XOR MACofa
message the sender chooses a random 1-1 bit string r (known as seed) and then computes
thetag(r, t)using
t = F,(OIl,)<ll F,(lll< 1>II M,)<llF ,(I II< 2 >II M,)<ll .. F,(lll<" >11M.).
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Here II denotes concatenation and FK represents a finite pseudo random function such as a
block cipher (e.g. DES) wilh it key K. Set the MAC of M to the pair (r, t). Thus Ihe sender
transmits (M, r. r). The receiver verifies the message by computing t' from M and r (and
K), This is a paraJlelizable slruclUre and hence suitable for long messages and/or
expensive PRFs. The other feature is the MAC is incremental wilh respect to
substitutions. When it is computing the lag for a related message (e.g. only one block is
different) only a constant amount of computation is required [36],
In counter based XOR scheme. a sender maintains an n-bit counter C which is
initially 0 and incremented for each message. Authentication has to follow these steps.
increment the counter C by 1
set t:: Ft (0 II c) El'l FlO II< I >II MI)El'lF tOIl< 2 >II M 2)El'l .• FtOll<n >11M.)
set Ihe MAC of M to (c, t)
The sender transmits (M, c•.t). The receiver calculates t'using the received (M', c: t') and
accepts the message if t = t',
2.3.2 Keyed Hash Function Based MACs
A function HO Ihat maps a fixed length key K and an arbitrary length message M
to a n-bit message digest MD is a keyed hash function. if it satisfies the following
properties [23].
The description of HO is publicly known.
Given K and M, it is easy to compute H(K, M),
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Without knowledge of K, it is hard both to find M when H(K, M) is given, and to
find two distinct messages M and M' such that H(K, M)= H(K, M').
Given (possibly many) pairs of {M;, MDil with MD1 = H (K, M/), it is hard to find
the secret key K.
Without knowledge of K, it is hard to detennine H(K, M) for any message M.
even when a large set of pairs {MI, H(K, MI)}. where MI s are selected by the
opponent (M;t Mil 'rJ MI ), is given.
Keyed hash functions can be constnlcted from existing hash functions. Hence some
security requirements of the designed keyed hash function rely on the security of the
underlying nash function. Basically three methods have been adopted in constnlcting
keyed hash functions [23}. "Hash then encrypt" is the simplest keyed hash function which
can be defined as
H(K,M)' E(K,H'(M)
where Kis the secret key,M is the message, Wis the one-way hash function and E is the
encryption algorithm.
The second method is the nested hash function. There are many schemes of
constructing keyed hash functions using this method. In these schemes the hash function
introduces a key by setting it as the initial vector. Hash functions are nested with different
initial vectors. Suppose H' is a one way hash function. The round function f can be
defined as
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where, MI is the ,<111 message block, Xi is the chaining variable (output of the last round),
"II" represents concatenation and XI '" IV', which is set to the key K. This is shown in
Figure 11. The keyed hash function would be
H (K, M) = f(j( .. .fif(K, M,), M,), ." M•. ,), M.).
It has been found that this scheme does not satisfy the fourth property required for a
keyed hash function. This also suffers from padding attack, which is explained in section
2.4.3. Hence a modified keyed hash algorithm was developed which introduces a new
"salt value" S. The construction is given Figure 12. The H" can be built using the round
function explained earlier. In these schemes the several hash operations increase the
overhead and decrease the hash throughput
TV' Xi
Figure 11. Round function using
nested hash functions
Figure 12. Modified keyed hashed function
with nested hash functions.
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Other methods using a key as part of a message or initial vector have been
proposed. In doing so the speed of the constructed hash function remains almost as fast as
the hash function. Many schemes have been developed according 10 this melhod.
Tsudik [37] suggesled three methods: secret prefix, secret suffix and envelop
method. These methods are only based on one-way hash functions and use keys to make
them secure. UH' is a collision free hash funclion, K (= KIll K2) is a secret key, then the
keyed hash function H(K, M) is defined as follows.
Secret prefix method:
H(K,M)=W(lV, (KIIM).
This method is not susceptible to the birthday attack, which is explained in 2.4.1. But
since the atlacker knows the underlying hash algorithm and the integrity value is not
protected, there can be a padding attack (see section 2.4.3). A counter measure for this
attack is 10 include the message length in the secret prefix calculation, as part of the flJ'St
block. Some protocols such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)(38]
utilize this method.
Secret suffix method:
H(K,M)=W(IV,(MII K)).
This is suitable for high bandwidth and low delay requirements such as packetized voice
and video applications. One drawback of the secret suffix method is the susceptibility to
the birthday auack (see 2.4.1).
Envelope method:
H (K, M) =W(IV, (K, II Mil K,».
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The message is enveloped with a secret prefix and a secret suffix before its digest is
computed. This is claimed to be more secure than the previous methods and is resistant to
both padding and birthday attacks.
In all these three methods the key size would be either the block size of the
message or twice that. Hence the processing speed is reduced by extra block processing
time. The security solely depends on the underlying hash function. A detailed analysis of
these methods can be seen in [39}. In that Preneel et al. also have suggested a heuristic
construction. MD,,-MAC which is free from some of the previous weaknesses. This trend
was continued further by Bakhtiari et al. as in [4OJ. They introduced six improved
methods using small keys (128 bits). In these schemes H' ( ) is a collision free basil
function, K=(KI II Kl) is the secret key, '$ and ~ are special XOR operations between
two entities (X and Y) of different lengths as described below:
X i" Y - The shorter one (between X and Y) is padded by zeros from the right hand
side to make its length same as the other and then they are XORed.
X§I Y - The shorter one is padded by zeros from the left hand side to make its length
same as the other and then they are XORed.
The methods are summarized below.
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(I)H(K,M)"" H'UV,(K$M))
(2)H(K.M),H'(N.M)
(3)H(K,M). H'(N,(M~K))
(4)H(K,M)=H'(lV,(K"M~K»
(5)H(K,M)=H'(N,(M~K)) where TV= K
(6)H(K,M)=H'(lV,(M~Kl» where /V=K,
The concatenation of the key to the message in earlier methods has been
eliminated by using XOR operation. Since the key does not increase the length of the
input, processing speed is not affected. But some of these methods have some
weaknesses. For example (I) and (2) methods suffer from padding attack. The authors
claimed that the method (5) would be the best as it is safe enough against the possible
auacks and at the same time is efficient.
In 1996 M. Bellare et al.(3) presented two constructions, which could be formally
analyzed without resorting to unrealistic assumptions such as "idea!ness" of the
underlying hash functions. Their approach of keying the hash function is to substitute the
secret key for the functions fixed initial value IV. The fixed and known IV of the original
function is replaced by a random and secret value K known only to the communicating
parties. The two constructions proposed by them were nested MAC (NMAC) and the
hash-based MAC (HMAC). In these schemes the iterated construction methodology for
construction of collision-resistant hash functions [27J, is utilized. The input is hashed by
iterating the compression function. If the input is M, then
where IMII = 1. The value of iterated function F on M is h~. where
35
Their approach is to substitute the secret key to Ihe functions fixed IV. Lei the keyed
compression function and its iterated function be defined asfl( and FI(, respectively. If K=
(Kl. K2) where Kj and K2 are the keys to the function of length I each:
NMAC(M) =!I(.(M) = (FK1 (Fn(M»)
Here the outer function acts on the oUlput of the iterated function and hence involves
only one iteration of the compression function. That is, the outer function is the
compression function acting on the FK2 (M) padded 10 a full block size. So, even though
NMAC construction is simple and efficient, it requires direct access to the code for the
compression function rather than the overaJl hash function. HMAC was suggested to
avoid that requirement [3].
In HMAC the two k.eys are derived pseudorandomly from a single key, which is
an advantage at the level of key management. Let F be the key-less hash function with
initial value iV. The arbitrary length message is processed with random string K of length
las follows
HMAC (M) = F (K' lD opad. F (K'lD ipad, M»
where K'is the padded Kwith required 'O's to a one b·bit block size of the iterated hash
function. Here, ipad is the byte OX 36 and opad is the byte OX 5C each repeated 64 times.
These values are chosen to have high hamming distance between the pads. They are sel to
exploit the mixing properties atlributed 10 the compression function underlying the hash
schemes in use. These are important propenies to provide computational independence
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between the two derived keys. The complete implementation and perfonnance analysis of
HMAC based on SHA-I is discussed in Section 4.4.
2.3.3 Universal Hash Function Based' MACs
The idea of the universal hash function was introduced by Carter and Wegman in
1979 [4IJ. Two years later they introduced MACs using universal hash families [42].
According to this, the message M is hashed to a smaller size using a function from a
universal hash function family, which has only a combinatorial (rather than a
cryptographic) property. Then a cryptographic primitive with one·time pad and
encryption is applied to the resulting smaller string to produce the MAC as in Pigure 13
[43J.
M
Tag
Figure 13. Carter-Wegman MACs
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By definition, a finite multiset of hash functions H={h: A....,.B} is said to be universal if
for every x, y eA where x :F y: Prho;H [h(x) =h(y)J =I~BI. Further, a finite multiset of
hash functions H={h: A....,.BI is e-Almost Universal (E-AU) if for all x,y eA where x '*y,
Prho;H [h(x) = h(y)J:;; e.
The above approach has been suggested as a promising way for a highly secure,
ultra-fast MAC. The speed of universal hashing MAC depends on the speed of hashing
step and the speed of the encryption step. If hash function compresses messages well,
encryption will be faster. The combinatorial property of the universal hash function
family can be mathematically proven without cryptographic hardness assumptions.
Several fast-tQ-Compute hash functions have been developed. Among them, the
divisional hash is a method related to Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRe) computations,
which is shown to be e-AU for a small e. A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) based
Toeplitz hash is another method, which is based on matrix-multiplication. Both these
methods allow efficient hardware implementation [43J. In 1995 Rogaway suggested
bucket hashing [44], which is used in the context of Wegman-Carter authentication (42).
This has been explicitly targeted for software implementation. Halevi and Krawczyk
proposed Multilinear Modular Hashing (MMH) and Nonlinear Modular Hashing (NMH)
which take full advantage of microprocessor technologies such as Intel's MMX and 64-
bit architecture, to achieve Gbps rates [45]. The Universal Message Authentication Code
(UMAC) was proposed in 1999 [46J. This has been targeted for high throughput software
implementations. Unlike traditional inherently serial MACs, UMAC is parallelizable. The
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underlying hash function family is known as New Hash (NH), wh.ich is a simplification
of MMH and NMH. The details of this algorithm are discussed in Chapter 6.
2.4 Attacks on Hash Functions
A successful attack on a hash function means finding a melhod to falsify a
claimed security property of the hash function. There are two main groups of attacks:
general and special attacks. The special attacks depend on the weaknesses of the
underlying algorithm and the general attacks are independent of the algorithm.
2.4.1 General Attacks
This group of attacks only depends on the message digest length. The birthday
attack, exhaustive key search, pseudo key attack and random attack are some examples of
this group.
Birthday attack:
This attack is one of the most powerful attacks on hash functions with unifonn
message digest distribution and short message digest length. This is based on the
"birthday paradox" which is a label for the following phenomenon: Given a random
variable that is an integer with unifonn disuibution between I and N and a selection of k
instances (k ~ N) of the random variable, it can be shown that[16J
P(N,k) > l.e-{i(l.l))'2N
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where, P(N, k) is the probability that there is at least one duplicate. According to chis, lhe
value of k required for P(N, k) > 0.5 can be shown as 1.18(N)112, which is approximately
(N)lll. The birthday paradox gets its name from a special case with N =365 for which the
value of k is '" 19. This means that the minimum number of people required for at least
two people have the same birthday with the probability about 0.5 is 19. Suppose the
message digest of m bits is produced by a hash function on the message M. According to
the birthday paradox, if the hash function is applied to k random inputs, the value of k so
that there is a probability about 0.5 for at least one duplicate will be 2ot1l• The adversary
creates a pool of many message and digest pairs. When the anacker intercepts a message
digest, it is compared with all message digests in the pooL In the case of a match, the
corresponding message is sent instead of the original message. If an adversary generates
'I variations on a bogus message and "2 variations on a genuine message, the probability
of finding a bogus message and a genuine message that hash to the same result can be
approximated by
where "2»1 [47]. When '1= "2 ='J.""2, the above probability is about 0.5. To achieve
security against a birthday attack, the hash value should be at least 128 bits [48].
Exhaustive key search
If the adversary has access to at least one message-digest pair. the key can be
found by examining the key space elements against the message-digest pairs. As the
message space does not have a one-to-one map 10 digest space, more than one key could
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be found. However there is a possibility to determine the key if a large number of pairs is
given [23J.
Pseudo Attack
The adversary tries to find a pseudo key K with H (K, M) = H (K ,M) where H is
the keyed hash function, K is the actual key and M is the message. This is similar to
finding more than one key in exhaustive key search and may allow the enemy to identify
himself as a legitimate user.
Random Attack
In this attack the adversary chooses a random message (or part of a message) and
expects that its message digest is equal to a genuine one. If the message digest length is r
then the success probability of this attack for a hash function, which has the required
random behavior, is In'. By having at least 128 bits for the message digest this attack
can be thwarted [23].
2.4.2 Special Attacks
These attacks depend on the round function or in general the hash function design.
1bese are not successful in keyed hash functions as the key protects the hash components
against outsiders. Examples of this attack are rneet·in-the middle attack, correcting block
attack, fixed point attack, attack on the underlying block cipher, and differential and
linear cryptanalysis. The details of these attacks are given in [48J and [40].
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2.4.3 High Level Attaeks
These are altacks on hash functions when used in a protocol or for non-hashing
purposes. Examples are the replay attack and padding attacks. Attaching time stamps to
lIle messages can thwart the replay attack. In padding attacks the intruder tries to append
(or prepend) a message to the existing one such that the legitimate parties would accept
the result. If[M, MD] with MD :[(M, K) is sent to the receiver. the intruder tries to find
M'such that [(M II M'), MD} or {(M' II M), MOl is scnt instead of (M, MD] [40]. Padding
attacks can be lhwarted by pre-pending the message length to the message or by using
some fixed suffixes that do not appear within the message.
2.5 Condusion
We discussed the background of this research with the brief description of the
IPSEC, which is one of the main areas of application of hash algorithms. Next. a detailed
investigation of hash functions and message authentication codes that have been
developed so far was carried out. In this section, many popular cryptographic hash
functions and message authentication codes were elaborated. The attacks on hash
functions were described there after.
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Chapter 3
Design Environment and Implementation Choices
The main objective of this research is to develop an efficient hardware design for
the hash algorithms widely used in Internet security, to give ma:<.imum speed and
minimum hardware utilization. In this chapter we discuss some of the main issues that
have to be considered in this effon.
3.1 Hardware vs. Software Implementation.
Today, software implementations of cryptographic algorithms are more prevalent
than hardware implementations. They provide more flexibility since any algorithm can be
executed on a processor. They allow ease of upgrading, ease of use and portability. But
there is a growing trend of many companies in security business in developing
multifunctional cryptographic accelerators. The hardware implemenlation of
cryptographic algorithms is thriving in the new century because of the growing
requirement for high speed, high volume secure communications combined with physical
security [53]. Hardware implementation is more attractive due to the fact that it can take
advantage of bit level and instruCtion-level parallelism that is not accessible to general.
purpose processors [54]. A software implementer is trying to efficiently express an
algorithm in terms of an existing hardware device. Hence the speed of the software
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implementation is restricted to the speed of the computing platform. Whereas a hardware
implementer is designing a device to perform the algorithm that has far more degrees of
freedom. He can explore different versions of the same design as alternatives. This is
clear when exploiting the parallelism of an algorithm. In software, the available execution
units of a processor are used to maximize performance. A hardware implementation can
be designed to best exploit the inherent parallelism of an algorithm. As well, hardware
implementation can be optimized for speed or size. In this case size translates much more
directly into cost than in lhe case for software implementation.
Primarily hardware implementations can be targeted for two general technologies:
cuslOm, mask.~layered technology and re-configurable technology. Both of these
technologies have their own advantages and disadvantages. Typically these two are
known as Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Field Programmable
Devices (FPDs).
3.2 Implementation Using Custom Hardware
ASIC may be further categorized as full CUSlOrn IC and semi CUSlOrn IC. Full
custom ICs require the development of all the mask. layers at the transistor level. Since it
does not use pre-compiled, pre-characterized cells, it is a time consuming process. The
full custom ASIC design melhodology offers high system performance since special
attention can be given lO critical devices and interconnections. System performance can
be optimized by sensibly controlling factors such as device location, transistor sizing and
interconnecting (routing) length [551. This process takes a long time and more personnel.
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Hence this is expensive to manufacture and to design. The manufacturing lead-time is
about 8-weeks. Thus full custom AS1Cs are generally pursued only for performance
critical designs or high volume products, which can regain the initial investment.
In semi-custom ASICs all of the logic cells are predesigned and some (or all) of
the mask layers are customized. There are two types of semi custom ASICs; standard
cell-based ASICs (CBICs) and gate array based ASICs {56). CBICs use predesigned
standard logic cells. These cells can also be used along with larger predesigned cells
known as mega cells such as micro controllers. The designer can place a cell anywhere
on the silicon and hence all the mask layers are unique to a particular customer. The
advantages of CBlCs are saving time and reducing risk by using standard cells. The main
disadvantages are the cost of standard cell libraries and time needed to fabricate all layen
for each new design.
In gate-array (GA) based ASICs the transiston are predefined as a base array on
the silicon wafer by replicating a base cell. Only the top few layers of metal, which define
the interconnect between transistors, are defmed by the designer using custom masks. To
distinguish these from other types of gate arrays, this type of ASIC is often known as
Masked Gate Array (MGA) [561. The designer chooses pre-designed gate array cells
known as macros from a library. The base-celliayout is the same for each logic cell, and
only the interconnect (inside cells and between cells) is customized. There are three types
of GAs; channeled, channel-less and structured GAs. The costs for all the initial
fabrication steps for an MGA are shared for each customer and this reduces the cost of an
MGA compared to a full-custom or standard-eell ASIC design. These custom ASICs
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provide a specific functionality for a particular design. The design must be implemented
all the way from the behavioral description to lhe physical layout and sent for the
expensive and time-consuming fabrication [56).
3.3 Field Programmable Devices (FPDs)
FPDs have a fast design turnaround. FPGAs are a complex version of FPDs. They
have no customized mask layers. The core is a regular array of programmable logic cells
that can be implemented combinationally or sequentially.
Basically the FPDs can be divided into three categories. Simple Programmable
Logic Devices (SPLDs), Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs) and FPGAs
[571.
SPLDs
All small FPDs including Programmable Logic Arrays (PLAs), Programmable Array
Logic devices (PALs) and PAL-like devices come under this category. These are suitable
only for small designs.
CPLDs.
This is a large capacity device based on SPLD architectures interconnected on a single
chip. For commercial CPLDs the main switching methods are Erasable Programmable
ROM (EPROM) and Electrically Erasable PROM (EEPROM). Both methods use floating
gale transistor technology. Due to rapidly growing market, there are many CPLD
products including the Altera Max5000, 7000 and 9000 series and the Xilinx XC9000
series. CPLDs provide logic capacity of about 50 typical SPLD devices. So they can have
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around 9000 system gates. They are widely used for many applications including high-
speed networking, power conscious portable designs and in-system programming
applications.
FPGAs
FPGAs consist of an array of unconunitted circuit elements (logic cells) and
interconnecting resources. The end user can configure it through programming. There are
two types of logic cells: multiplexer based (e.g. Actel) and lookup-table based (Xilinx,
Lucent). A basic logic cell has a fixed number of inputs and outputs and can implement a
certain set of functions. There are two classes of commercial FPGAs depending on the
switching technology: antifuse and Static-RAM (SRAM). Actel, Cypress, Crosspoint,
Quicklogic are some devices of antifuse technology. Antifuse·based devices are
programmed once and hold their programs across power cycles and are not mutable once
progranuned. Xilinx, Altera-Aex, Atmel's CLl family, Toshiba are SOffie examples of
SRAM switching technology. These devices have the advantage of in-circuit re-
programmability, but must be programmed each time they are powered up and hence the
configuration data has to be stored in an external ROM {57]. FPGAs promote short time
to market, high flexibility with capability for frequent modifications of hardware and low
development cost For cryptographic application, they also have a capability to allow for
time sharing of one integrated circuit. Hence they provide many advantages for vendors
and users of cryptographic equipment [53]. Due to the immense flexibility of FPGAs by
incorporating a large amount of routing resources into a device, the gate-ta-gate delays in
such devices are higher than those of ASIC devices. But it is still possible to overcome
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such drawbacks by using more parallelism in the FPGA designs. Unfortunately complex
designs tend to create many more logic levels in FPGAs than ASrCs and become difficult
to debug. As well, much of the mixed-signal functionalities available in Asrcs are not
common in FPGAs. But today's highly competitive market, the first product [0 market
establishes strong market share. In this case FPGAs provide an alternative that save
designers lime in the final verification cycle and in the long ASIC design process.
3.4 FPGA Implementation of CryptograpWc Algorithms
In general, hardware implementation can achieve superior performance compared
to software implementation. FPGA implementation is a highly promising alternative for
implementing cryptographic algorithms. The fine granularity of FPGAs matches
extremely well the operations required by most of the cryptographic algorithms.
Especially the basic operations involved in private key cryptographic algorithms such as
bit-permutation, byte substitution, lookup table readings and boolean operations can be
implemented in FPGAs more efficiently than in a general purpose computer. As well the
inherent parallelism of the algorithms can be efficiently exploited in FPGAs but not in the
serial computing of a uniprocessor environment. This was widely studied during the
process of developing an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NISn [49] in the U.S. Apart from the rigorous security
analyses. AES candidate algorithms were 5tudied for effil;iem,;y in both hardware and
software implementations. It has been seen that use of a simple cipher design with simple
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operations that possesses both cryptographic and good overall cipher efficiency is
desirable for FPGA implementations (50].
The AES candidate algorithms involve boolean operations, modulo 231 addition
and subtraction, fixed point snifting, variable rotation, modulo 232 multiplication, Galois
Field 28 multiplication and lookup tables [5IJ. Modem FPGAs have a structure of two-
dimensional array of configurable logic units interconnected via a large routing matrix.
Configurable logic units are comprised of look up tables and flip.flops. Lookup tables
can be configured as either combinational logic or memory elements. Modem FPGAs
have variable size RAM blocks, which can be used as memory elements or as look up
tables. The most complex operations of the block ciphers are the modulo 232
multiplication and the variable rotation. The substitutions or S-boxes can be implemented
in either combinatorial logic or embedded RAM blocks. However due to the limited bit
width, limited number of RAM blocks and the nigher switching time of the RAM
compared to that of a standard CLB slice elements, the latter option is not feasible [51J.
When a cfpher consists of larger S-boxes and more complex operations it becomes more
resource intensive. The basic operations such as bit-wise XOR, modulo 232 addition and
subtraction and fixed value shifting are implemented from simple hardware elements and
hence they are fast. The Galois field multiplication in AES candidates is implemented
efficiently in hardware as it involves multiplication by a constant [51J. It utilizes fewer
resources than general multiplication. At the cryptographic-round level of the AES
candidate block ciphers, multiple operations can be executed concurrently. Some
operation modes (e.g. Electronic Code Book mode) allow concurrent processing of
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multiple blocks of data. Hence if multiple rounds are implemented. any desired speed up
of throughput can be achieved compared to a single round implementation. FPGA also
provides agile key-context switching. This is the ability to generate key dependent data in
early rounds before the data is required. This avoids the excessive latency in context
switching that appears in software implementations [52J.
There are several other potential advantages of cryptographic algorithms
implemented using FPGAs. Algorithm agility is one such benefit. Many security
protocols such as SSL and Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) allow multiple
encryption/authentication algorithms. These are generally negotiated on a per-session
basis. For instance, IPSEC allows 30ES, Blowfish. CAST, IDEA, RC4 and RC6 as
algorithms with future extensions. Algorithm agility offers the capability of switching of
cryptographic algorithms during operation. It is possible to upgrade a programmed device
with a new algorithm, which did not exist (or was not standardized) during design stage.
Swapping a standardized algorithm with a proprietary one or changing the mode of
operation are possible as well.
3.5 Device Selection
When examining cryptographic hash functions for hardware implementation,
various key aspects involving the selection of the target device, design development
environment and the design architectures emerge. It is clear that the number of input {
output (ItO) pin requirement would be a significant factor as the algorithms deal with
large data streams and the keys of minimum size of 64·bits (in case of HMAC·MD5)
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{58]. The output also has at least 64 bits (truncated HMAC·MD5 output). The MD5
algorithm utilizes 64 constants each of 32 bits in length. It would be reasonable for them
to be stored in a ROM. As well the necessity of exploring different architectures and
optimizing the design using various techniques, results in selecting a resource-rich
device. It should be able to provide the large amount of hardware resources and il should
be flexible so that the design can be optimized. Although the COSI of high-end FPGAs is
relatively high, the rapid pace of developing these devices may result in the decrease of
the FPGA cost in the future market. Therefore a high-end FPGA device was selected for
this design. Based on the above requirements, the Xilinx Virtex XCV1000FG6S0-6 was
chosen as the target device.
3.5.1 Virtex Architecture
The XCVlOOO virtex device comprises a 64 x 96 array of look-up-table based
configurable logic blocks (CLBs) each of which includes four logic cells (LCs). These
CLBs provide the functional elements for constructing logic. Each LC has a 4-input
function generator, carry logic and a storage element (Figure 14). Two logic cells form a
slice which is often used as the unit to express the hardware utilization. The function
generators are implemented as 4-input Look-Up-Tables (LUTs). Each LUT can be
configUred as 16:<1 bit synchronous RAM. Two LUTs can be combined to create a 16:<2
bit or a 32x1 bit synchronous RAM. or a 16xl bit dual port synchronous RAM [59]. The
storage element can be configured either as edge triggered 0 flip-flops or as level
sensitivelatehes.
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CIN
Figure 14. 2-slice Virtex CLB [59].
CIN
The XCVlOOO device has a 68Q-pin ball grid array package, which. provides .512 VO pins
and over one million system gates. The Virtex device incorporates several large block
select RAMs (BRAMs), organized in COIUITUlS. These complement the distributed LUT
based RAM structure in CLBs. The XCYlOOO has 32 block select RAM blocks. Each
block is a fully synchronized dual port 4096-bit RAM. These can be configured eilher as
RAMs or ROMs.
Virtex devices feature a flexible, regular architecture that comprises an array of
CLBs surrounded by programmable input output blocks (lOBs). AU these are
interconnected by a rich hierarchy of fast, versatile routing resources (Figure 15), The
abundance of routing resources is attractive for implementing large and complex designs.
"VersaRing" facilitates pin swapping and pin locking, which are required for adopting
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the ex.isting PCB layouts when the device is redesigned (59]. Virtex device also includes
four clock delay locked loops (DLLs) for advanced clock controls.
DL lOBs DL
VersaRlng
HJl~ 1 m CUI. i~ ";; ~ Ii'
VersaRlng
DLL 10.. DLL
Figure 15. Virtex architecture overview [59].
3.5.2 Il<sign Methodology
Basically two hardware design methodologies are available: Hardware Design
Language (HDL) based method and schematic based method. In general schematic based
designs give slightly betler results in terms of area and speed compared to their HOL
based counterparts. However a schematic based method is not feasible for large complex
designs [51). Hence an HOL based methodology, with Very High Speed Integrated
Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) as the language. was chosen. For the
synthesis and implementation the tools provided by Canadian Microelectronics Company
(CMC) were used.
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3.5.3 Design Flow
In these implementations, the FPGA design flow given by Xilinx was utilized.
Figure 16 shows the main steps of this flow.
HDL
Functional Simulatioo Data
Roports
Reports
<:];havioral Simulator::::>
, :10.. ,
: Design 'i Manager
t-,~~~~TImin Simulation data
t-<:ij;;;"";;dtRi£out!niID<'L:::J--+-=~F='l=--'
Configuratioo Simulator
PROM file formatter HlWdeblJoger
Figure 16. FPGA Design flow [60J
Initially the behavioral model of the design is implemented using VHDL. In this design
there are some standard operations for which we can use the Xilinx library cores, which
have already been optimized. These components can be generated using the Core
Generator. This is a tool used for parameterizing cores that have been optimized for
Xilinx FPGAs. The advantages of using a core based design process include shorter
design cycle time, reduced risks and improved performance through higher levels of
integration, among others (61]. The behavioral model is simulated for functional
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correctness using Synopsys VHDL System Simulator (VSS). Then the VHDL model is
synthesized to create the netlist file using FPGA Express provided by Synopsys Inc.
During synthesis the design is flattened 10 a large number of processes that communicate
vja signals known as nets. The nellist file is a data structure that describes all of the
components connected to each net [62J.
In order 10 carry out the functional simulation, the design has to be translated
using the Xilinx flow engine. This uses the Native Generic Database Build (NGDBuild)
program to read the netlist file along with any constraints specified and create the NGD
file. The NGD file contains the logical description of the design expressed both in terms
of the hierarchy used when the design was frrs! created and lower level Xilinx primitives
to which the hierarchy resolves (63). Therefore this functional simulation is also known
as the post-NGDBuild simulation. If this is satisfactory the design is mapped. AI this
level it is possible to carry out post-map simulation, which is a gate level simulation with
real gate delays and estimated delays for routing. This simulation is useful in determining
if there are obvious timing issues in the design before carrying out place and route [64].
Finally, after the placed and route (PAR), the post·route simulation is carried out.
lbis is a gate level simulation with real delays for the gates and routing. At this point the
static timing analysis is carried out. Using the NGD file it is possible to create a structural
VHDL file and a Standard Delay Format (SDF) me. SDF is an indusuy·standard fonnat
for passing back-annotated delay information to the structural HDL. With these files the
timing simulation with back annotation can be carried out.
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After the PAR step, the CLBs on the chip must be configured to implement the
behavior of the netlist components that have been mapped, placed and routed to them.
This is done by detennining the values of configuration bits required to program the
device. This is called bit generation. By loading these configuration bits into the FPGA,
the device can be customized (621.
3.6 Hardware Architectures
The cryptographic hash functions studied in this thesis have an iterative structure
based on the method proposed by Merkle and Damgard [65]. The inherent sequential
nature of this structure provides only limited opportunities to enhance its perfonnance.
However several architecture options can be adopted. Loop unrolling architecture allows
for unrolling of multiple steps, up to the total number of steps required by the algorithm.
ln this approach as the number of unrolled steps increases the hardware utilization
increases but the complete algorithm processing delay decreases through hardware
minimization across steps. Iterative looping is a subset of loop unrolling in which only
one step is unrolled. The iterative approach in general minimizes the hardware
requirement but maximizes the time requirement since it needs a large number of clock
cycles to perfonn a hashing. By implementing partially unrolled designs it is possible to
have a range of area vs. time trade orfs. In this study, the following two extreme cases of
these hardware architectures are investigated:
Full loop unrolling
Iterative looping
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Full loop unrolling
This architecture allows for unrolling of multiple rounds up to the total number of
steps required by the hash algorithm. In this case all the rounds are implemented as a
single combinatorial block. Operations such as variable shifting can be directly
implemented without any hardware such as barrel shifters. The number of required
multiplexers can be reduced too. However, while this approach minimizes the time for a
hash operation, it maximizes the hardware utilization.
Iterative looping
Only a generic step is implemented and it is iterated for the number of steps
required for the hash operation. This approach has a low register-to-register delay but
requires large number of clock cycles to perfonn a hash operation. In general, although it
needs extra components such as multiplexers and barrel shifters, the hardware utilization
is reduced.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter the appropriateness of FPGA implementation of cryptographic
algorithms was discussed with a description of some previous studies related to AES
candidale algorilhms. Here, several potential advantages of cryptographic algorithms
implemented using FPGAs were mentioned. Following the main issues of
implementation associated with this research, the design environment and
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implementation choices were discussed. The architecture of lhe target device and lhe
design flow ulilized for the syn!hesis and implementation were explained. Finally the two
architeclures !hal were adopled for the implementation were briefly introduced. In the
next chapter the delails of implementation of MOS, SHA-l and HMAC-SHA·l will be
presented.
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Chapter 4
Implementation ofMD5, SHA-l and HMAC-SHA·l
In this chapter, various aspects of the implemenlation of MD5. SHA-I and
HMAC·SHA-l algorithms are discussed. lnilially the design details of the architectures
are explained and then the simulation results are discussed. The actual implementation
results and some optimization techniques are elaborated thereafter. Finally the
perfonnance analysis is carried out for all the designs based on the implementation
results.
The design flow given in Section 3.5.3 was used throughout lhe implememation
process. The implementation involves several simulations at different stages. This
process assures the correct functionality of the design at each stage before proceeding to
lhe next level aCthe design flow.
4.1 MD5 Implementation
MD5 algorilhm is a block-chained hashing algorithm. The hash for a block
depends on both the block data and the hash of its preceding block. As a result, blocks
cannot be hashed in parallel. Each step consists of four additions, three component
logical operalions, two table lookups and one rotation. The tree of operations can be
optimized by perfonning operations, which involve items not dependent on the previous
59
step, early. According to Figure 7. the item that depends on the previous step is word "B"
and hence the result of logical operation has a considerable delay. The optimized tree of
operation (assuming each operation lakes one unit time) will be as given in Figure 17.
According to this one time unit step can be reduced from the times required for the
general structure given in Figure 7 [66].
S"VaiuldependlIcn
-....
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Figure 17. Optimized operation tree
As discussed in the previous chapter. two architectural options are investigated
and implemented: iterative looping and full loop unrolling. Both architectures are
implemented at the behavioral level in VHDL. synthesized and functionally simulated.
After verifying the functionality, the design undergoes the process of the flow engine.
The functionality of the PAR implementations is then fe-simulated with back·annotated
timing using the same test vectors used in functional simulation. thereby verifying that
the implementation of the design is successful. In both designs, it is assumed that the fIrst
two phases of the algorithm have already been performed and the input of message
blocks can be controlled according to the state machine states.
60
4.1.1 Iterative Architecture
By implementing a generic step of the MD5 algorithm, a looping architecture
with 64 iterations provides the greatest area optimized solution. In this design "M05
iterative core" is the generic step. which is shown in Figure 18. A few additional
multiplexers and a barrel shifter have to be used to perfonn the selection of the round
function and the variable shifting in each round. Among the several components, the
block select RAMs, ROMs, adders, registers and multiplexers are parameterized using
core generator modules of the XiJinx tool.
.. ..
Figure 18. M05 iterative core
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The block diagram of the iterative design data path is shown in Figure 19. The
message is loaded using a 32-bit bus "X_in" and the digest appears as four 32-bit words.
The "X_in counter" provides the addresses (X_count) for 16 words of a message block to
be written into the RAM modules. The "X_sel" signal from the "MD5 iterative state
machine" provides the address for reading the appropriate message word from a RAM
module. The "RAM select counter" is used to count the cycles required to switch
between the two RAMs for reading and writing.
tnil
s.., -=====-- --'
Figure 19. Block diagram ofMD5 iterative design.
The "MD5 iterative state machine" provides aU the control signals required for all the
operations. The basic state diagram is shown in Figure 20. This has 68 states including
the three states required for initializing and loading the very ftrst block to the core. The
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subsequent block operations need 65 states. An important feature of this design is the
loading of message blocks in parallel with computation. The two RAMs can be utilized to
load the next block while the present block is being used in computation. This eliminates
the loading time from the total time to process all but the first block. The 512-bit message
block is loaded to the core using a 32-bit bus.
~Ioading~ CounLdone
ReseLstate
Figure 20. State diagram for MD5 iterative design
The "ReseUtate" signal initiates the stale machine and the counters at the "idle" stale.
Then with the "Start" signal the function starts with moving to "geeset" state, 1be initial
vectors are loaded in parallel to the input register and to a buffer. The initial vectors as
well as the chaining variables are kept in this buffer until the 64d1 step to get added with
the last result to fonn the chaining variable for the next block. Then during the "loading"
state. the first block is loaded to the "XRAMI" using the addresses given by the "X_in
counter", After that the state machine starts to provide addresses for reading of
"XRAMI". Using the first 16 addresses provided by the state machine, the next block is
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written to "XRAM2". After the 64th step, ';XRAM2" is read. During the first 16 steps of
processing the second block, the third block is written to "XRAMI", This reading and
writing of RAMs alternates in every 64-clock cycles, Subsequent blocks utilize the
previous chaining variable as their initial values. At the end of 64th step, if the
"End_msg" signal is asserted, digest appears at the OUlput as fOUf 32-bit words, The
"Done" signal indicates that the digest has been created.
4.1.2 Fun Loop UnroUed Architecture
The full loop unrolled architecture has a 64-step combinational logic core as
shown in Figure 21. This provides the best time-optimized solution,
32
"-"(Message)
4
64 -Sleps
Figure 21. MD5 full loop-unrolled core
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In this architecture all the elements of each step are implemented as
combinational logic. The barrel shifter has been replaced by direct wiring of appropriate
shifted bits in each step. As with the iterative design, the use of double buffering ("XX"
and "YY") eliminates the loading time from the critical timing path. The next block is
loaded during the computation of the prese", block. "IV ROM" provides the initialization
vector for the first step. The "Load_done" signal makes the initialization vector and the
chaining variables available for the first block and for the subsequent blocks respectively.
During computation of the digest for a block, the next block is stored in buffer
"YY" and after the computation the "YY2XX" signal goes high and hence "XX" obtains
the new input for the next computation. The block diagram of the complete data path is
given in Figure 22.
._._---~_._----------------~------..:--------------_._._--~
Figure 22. Block diagram of full-loop-unrolled design.
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In addition to the core, the other main components are the state machine. "}Lin counter"
used for loading the blocks to the core and "Waiccounter" utilized to count the number
of cycles for the combinational logic delay of the computation.
Similar to the iterative design. the "ResecState" signal initiates the state machine
and the "}Cin counter", The initialization vectors are taken into the register "CV_Reg".
With the "Start" signal, the initial block is loaded to buffer "YY" and right after that
"YY2XX" signal loads it to buffer "XX" and the computation is conunenced, During
computation. the next block is loaded to buffer "YY". When alllhe blocks in the message
are processed. "En2" signal makes lhe digest available at lhe output of register,
"DigescReg".
The state machine is simpler lhan that of the iterative design. It has 11 states
including idle initializing and loading states as shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23. State machine for full loop unrolled design.
66
As in the iterative design, the "Reset_state" signal initiates the state machine and
the counters at the "idle" state. Then with the "Start" signal the function starts by moving
to "pre_load" state. The initial vectors are loaded to the input register. The first block is
loaded {o buffer "YY" during loading state and then it is transferred to buffer "XX"
during "bufCuansfer" state. In the state "computing-Ol" the next block is loaded to
buffer "YY" while the chaining variable for the present block. is being calculated. In the
state "computing-tO" the end of the message ("End_msg") is checked. If "End_msg" is
asserted the present calculation is continued in "pre-done" state otherwise the next state
will be "computing-II" state. When the state is "computing_U" the computation of
chaining variables of the intermediate blocks is carried out. The chaining variable of the
last block, which is the digest, is computed in "pre-done" state. Finally the "Done" signal
is asserted in "digesCdone" state. The output holds the digest in "MD5_digest" state until
the chip is reset by "Resecstate" signal.
4.1.3 Simulation, Synthesis and Implementation Results
Iterative Design
The implementation followed the design flow described in Section 3.5.3. All the
simulations were carried out using the test vectors given in [4}. Appendix Al gives the
complete simulation results. Figure 24 gives a functional simulation result. This has to be
studied along wilh Figure 18 and Figure 19. The test message and Ihe expected results in
hexadecimal are given below. These are represented in little endian formal.
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Test vector:
ABCDEFGHUKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345
6789
Expected digest (grouped in words):
Dl74AB98 D277D9F5 A5611C2C 9F419D9F
The 496-bit long message has to be appended with 463 zeros preceded by '1'. Then the
64-bit representation of the length of the message (''OOOOOlFO'') is appended. The words
of the resulting message are given below:
44434241,48474645, 4C4B4A49, 504F4E4D, 54535251, 58575655, 62615A59,
66656463, 6A696867, 6E6D6C6B, 7271706F. 76757473, 7A797877, 33323130,
37363534, ססOO3938, 0000CXXl0. (l()()(X)()()(), OOOIJO()(X), 0000CXXl0, 0000CXXl0,
0ס0ooooo, 0ס0ooooo, 0ס0ooooo, 0ס0ooooo, 0ס0ooooo, 0ס0ooooo, 0ס0ooooo,
0000CXXl0, 0ס0ooooo, OOOOOIFO, 0ס0ooooo.
Hence, this message has two 512-bit blocks.
The signals shown in Figure 24 are related to those of Figure 18 as follows:
imsl: CV_sel ims7: ShifUunnt imsl2: XENt ims17: En2
ims3: Init
ims4: Enl
ims9: X30unt
imslO: Count_done ims15: Load_done ims26: RmcnCreset
ims6: X_sel imsll: WEI ims16: Councen ims27: RmcoCen
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The ftrst block of message is written to X_RAMI using the address "X_addr" (imsI4)
provided by "X_in counter", During this time the "RarruelecLcounter" is disabled by
sening the signal "Rmcnuesel" (ims26) high. As "Load_done" signal (imsI5) becomes
high the state machine starts to give the addresses for loading the nellt block to X_RAM2.
Concurrently, the time computation of ftrst chaining variable begins. Now the
"Ram_selecLcounter" is enabled for alternating the RAMs for reading and writing. The
signals "WEI" (imsll) and "WE2" (imsI8) are assened accordingly. Since the reading
of ftrst 16 words is in sequence, those addresses can be used for writing the nell[ block on
to the other RAM. At the end of the message the "Start" signal goes low and after the last
step the four outputs, A_our.. B_oul, C_out and D_out hold the message digest.
The interface of the synthesized MD5 iterative design is given in Figure 25. The
design was implemented using medium effort for synthesizing and PAR. Then the
process was repeated with high effort. NellI, according to the critical path timing details,
"Period" timing constraint was introduced. Different constraint values were applied to
get the best timing result.
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CL.K[J,,-out<31'"Res.et_shtc !3-aut<:31,I1I'>
Shrt C_cut<31,11I>
X_ln<31:B> D_Dut<31: 0>
and_Asg Done
Figure 25. Interface of the MD5 iterative design
In the case of the iterative design, for all the implementation lrials of different
effort levels or constraints, the utilization of the extemal lOBs was 161 out 0(512 (31%)
and the block RAM usage was 2 out of 32 (6%). The number of slices used for this
architecture was significantly low. It was 877 out of 12288 (7%) and from this the barrel
shifter utilized 288 (2%). There is 4% utilization of three state buffers (TBUFs). The
summary of timing reports is given in Table 1. In this table the critical path delay is the
delay for a single iteration.
Table I. Timing report summary ofMDS iterative design
Medium High High Effort
Effort Effort with a
Timing
Constraint
Number of slices (% of total) 7% 7% 7%
Number of I/O block (% of total) 31% 31% 31%
Logic delay (% of total) 25.8% 37.7% 37.1%
Routing delay (% of total) 74.2% 62.3% 62.9%
Critical path logic levels 16 33 25
Total delay of critical path (ns) 39.57 35.75 34.68
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The critical path differed for different implementation trials. However, as the effon level
becomes higher and the constraints gel tighter, the critical path logic level has been
changed. But this has been limited to the CLBs, wh..ich have already been utilized for the
design during implememation with medium effort. Hence the total slice ulilization has
nOI been changed. The maximum delay of the critical path decides the frequency at which
the design can operate. According to the timing simulation the maximum frequency of
the design was 28.83 MHz. The perfonnance is discussed in Section 4.4.
Full loop unrolled design
The same procedure used for the iterative deign was adopted for implementation of full
loop unrolled design. The functional simulation results, for the same sel of test vectors
used in iterative design, are shown in Figure 27. This has to be referenced to the Figures
21 and 22. lnitially the test message has to be prepared by adding the padding bits and
length field as described for the iterative design. As "Reseu.tate" becomes low and
"Start" becomes high, the initial vectors appear at the output of ''CV_reg'': A_o, 8_0,
C_o and 0_0. The "x.jn coumer" is enabled by "Councen" signal (cnLen) for loading
message blocks to the array "YY" during the states "loading" and "computing I I". It is
disabled during the other states. The address for each 32-bit word is provided by
"X_in30unt" signal (count). The first block is written to both "YY" and "XX" arrays, as
the "YY2XX" signal (Y2X) is high during "loading" state. When it is done the
"Count_done" signal (cnt_done) becomes high and the block is used for computation of
the first chaining variable. The "WaiLcounter" is enabled as the "WaiUeset" (wLrst)
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signal becomes low. Unlike the iterative design, the computation time in this case is a
combinational delay of the critical path of the design. This delay is allocated by the
"Waiccounter" by counting a fixed number of clock cycles (60 cycles in this case). The
actual number of clocks has to be obtained according to the timing simulation results
after the design is place and routed. After the allocated time "Waiuione" (wUlone)
signal becomes high and the first chaining variable is available at the output as well as at
the output of the "CV_reg". Then "YY2XX" signal (Y2X) becomes high and the next
block is loaded to the array "XX" and it becomes available to the core for computation.
After the second computation the last chaining variable appears as four 32·bit words:
A_out, B_out, C_out and D_out. This is the expected digest in the little endian fonnat:
"D174AB98D277D9F5A561IC2C9F419D9F',
The hardware interface of the synthesized full loop unrolled design is shown in
Figure 26, As in the case of the iterative design, here also for all the three-
implementation trials the utilization of the external lOBs was 162 out of512 (31%). The
number of slices used for this architecture was 4838 out of 12288 (39 %). There was 2%
utilization of three state buffers (TBUFs).
Cu(·u,,_eut2<at,S)
Shr t 8_eu t2<31 , S)
x_ln<31 '8) C_out2<31' 8)
end_"sg D_ou t2<31 i iD
re's:et done
Figure 26. Interface of the MD5 full loop unrolled design
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The summary of timing reports is given in Table 2. In this table the critical path delay is
the delay for all the 64 steps.
Table 2. Timing report summary of MD5 full loop unrolled design
Medium High High Effort
Effort Effort with a Timing
Constraint
Number of slices (% oftota) 39% 39% 39%
NumberofIlO block(% of total) 31% 31% 31%
Logic delay (% of total) 37.8% 40.7% 43.6%
Routing delay (% of total) 62.2% 59.3% 56.4%
Critical path logic levels 857 860 882
Total delay in the critical path (os) 1195.90 1121.01 1054.12
According to Table 2, the optimization has improved the timing performance by
approximately 12 %. Although the logic level in the critical path has been increased.,
there has been a reduction in the routing delay. Due to the combinational nature of this
design, th~ block select RAMs could not be used for memory modules. The constructs
used to build the RAMs and ROMs have been configured using the LUTs. The possibility
of optimizing using high levels of efforts and timing constraints has been limited owing
to these factors.
The maximum clock frequency at which the design can operate does not depend
on the delay of the critical path, as it is purely combinational. Only the loading time of
the very first block. into the design core depends on this clock frequency. It has to be
decided by the maximum clock rate at which the controller can generate the signals
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without any set up violations. For this purpose the timing simulation was done for the
controller separately and the minimum clock period was found 10 be 14 ns. This will be
discussed later, under the performance analysis. The timing simulation at this frequency
is shown in Appendix A2.
4.2 SHA.llmplementation
The structure of SHA-l is based on that of the MD4 algorithm. Hence many of
Ihe same modules used for MD5 can be adopted for SHA·1 as well.
4.2.1 Iterative Architecture
As given in Section 2.2.5, for SHA-l, the words processed in each step are
derived from the words of the block being processed. The initial 16 words, whiclt are
used for the first 16 steps are directly obtained from the incoming message block. While
they are being processed, the next words (17th word and onwards) can be calculated by
XQRing four words from the previous 16 words together. In this case four words have to
be read at a time and the calculated word has to be stored in a suitable RAM to prevent
any clash between read and write operations among the modules in future steps. This can
be achieved by using eight RAM modules each of size 512 bits. The arrangement of the
RAM modules (RAM setup), which is an important part of the iterative design, is given
in Figure 28.
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The initial 16 words are written into eight RAMs during the loading period of the
block. Thereafter four RAMs are read at a time and 1'" word (t ~ 17), W, is calculated
while processing the first step using following relationship:
W, = 51 (W'.16 e W'_l~ e W,.g e W,.))
where, 51 is circular left shift of 32- bit argument by 1 bit. This is repeated until all the
80 words are available for computation.
Figure 28. RAM setup for creating 80 words.
The calculated word is written in a RAM, which will not have to be read and written at
the same time in a future step. The read and write process of the RAMs are given in
Appendix B. Using this RAM arrangement each step obtains the corresponding block
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word for that step. The iterative core of the design was constructed as in Figure 29. As in
MD5, the adders, multiplexers. registers, RAMs and ROMs were generated by
parameterizing the core generator modules. SHA·l has no variable shifting in its
compression function but has a fixed circular rotation. This can be easily implemented by
direct wiring of the shifted bits. SHA-l uses only four distinct constants, which are stored
in a small4-word ROM. "TYOM".
CV_&eI L.oacLdone
Figure 29. SHA-l iterative core
As mentioned earlier, an iterative looping architecture provides the most area-
optimized solution where a few multiplexers and RAMs are the additional hardware
components. The block diagram of the complete iterative SHA-I is given in Figure 30.
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The main components are the "Sf!A.-counler", the "SHA_l Iterative Core" and me "Slate
Machine" with 84 steps.
Figure 30. Block diagram of iterative design
The 512-bit message block is loaded to the core using a 32-bit bus. While the
"ReseCstate" signal initiates the state machine and the counters, the "Start" signal begins
the operation. The initial vectors are loaded in parallel to the input registers (A... E) and
to the buffer (~buf....E_buf). The initial vectors as well as the chaining variables are
kept in the buffer until the 80'" step to get added with the last result to fonn the chaining
variable for the next block. Initially the first block is loaded to the "RAM set up" using
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the addresses given by the state machine. Then a particular RAM module is read to obtain
the appropriate word for each step using the address given by the state machine.
Subsequent blocks utilize the previous chaining variable as their initial values. The digest
output comes as five 32·bit words.
4.2.2 Full Loop Unrolled Architecture
This architecture is similar to the full loop unrolled architecture of M05. In full
loop unrolled architecture, the core has an 80-step combinational logic block as shown in
Figure 31. All the elements of each step are implemented as combinational logic.
Figure 31. SHA-l full loop unrolled core
In this architecture all the elements of each step are implemented as combinational logic.
Again. the use of double buffering ("XX" and "YY'") eliminates the loading time from
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the critical timing path. The next block: is loaded during the computation of the current
block:. "IV ROM" provides the initialization vector for the first step. The "load_done"
signal makes the initialization vector and the chaining variables available for the first
block: and for the subsequent blocks respectively. During computation of the digest for a
block, the next block is stored in buffer "YY" and after the computation the "YY2XX"
signal goes high, hence the array "XX" obtains the new input for the next computation.
The block: diagram of the complete design is given in Figure 32.
Figure 32. Block: diagram of SHA·I full loop unroUed design
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The slate machine has eleven staleS. Further, the design has two counters,
"SHA_load_counter" and "SHA.-waiccounter". The fonner is used for loading the
blocks to the core and the latter is utilized to count the number of cycles for the
combinational logic delay of the computation. The "ResecStale" signal initiates the state
machine and the "SHA_loa(Ccounter". The initialization vectors are taken into the
register "CV_Reg". With the "Start" signal, the initial block is loaded to buffer "YY" and
then "YY2XX" signal loads it to buffer "XX" and the computation is cOllUnenced.
During computation, the next block is loaded to buffer "YY", When the state machine
observes the "End~msg" signal as high, all the blocks of the message are processed, Then
"En2" signal makes the digest available at the output of register, "DigesCReg". The
"Done" signal indicates the completion of the computation.
4.2.3 Simulation, Synthesis and Implementation
Both arclUteetures were behaviorally simulated and then synthesized. The design
was initially synthesized and implemented with medium effort. The process was repeated
several times with high efforts and with timing constraints. During implementation.
functional simulation was carried out and then timing simulation was done with back
annotation following synthesis. All the simulations were carried out using the test
vectors provided in secure hash standard [8].
l!erstiveA«bilecture
The simulations were carried out using following test suite. All the values are in
hexadecimal. The 32-bit values are stored in registers in big-endian format.
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Test vector: abe
Expected digest (grouped in words): A9993E36 4706S16A BA3E2571
7S50C26C 9CDODS9D
The ASCII binary code of the test vector is "0110001 01100010 01100011" (61 62 63 in
hexadecimal) and the message length is 24 bits. According to the algorithm, initially "I"
is appended and then 423 ''O''s are appended. Then the 64-bit representation of message,
''OOOOOOOO (X)(M)()()lS" is appended at the end. The resulting block is as follows:
61626380 OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
OOOOOOOO 00000o IS.
The simulation was performed using a 20 ns clock period. Figure 33 shows that, at the
end of "loading" state the signal "Enl" makes the initial value available for step 1.
Concurrently it is stored in the four 32-bit buffers "A_bur', "B_bur', ''C_bur', "D_buf'
and "E_bur'. During the loading time, all the 8 RAMs are enabled for writing by exerting
write enable signals (wea, weal, etc). The addresses are takeD from dle counter lhrough
dle state machine. During the SO steps reading from and writing into each memory
module are done in alternative manner. The primitive function for each round is selected
by the signal "Func_sel". The RAM setup controls (Figure 29, 30) make the appropriate
word "x_in_read" available at the RAM setup output for each step. At the end of s<t" step
"En2" is asserted and the output is available. In this design double buffering of data
loading has not been employed. However this could be achieved by employing several
methods. One of the methods is to have two identical RAM setups and alternating them
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foc different blocks using a eounter. Another method is to re-use the memory locations of
the RAM setup after the contents are used and by carefully managing the read and write
operations.
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The interface of synthesized SHA-I design is shown in Figure 34.
O A out2<31 0>eLI< -8_out2<31 l2l>End_n$g C_out2<31:a>Start D_out2<31' a>X_in<31:B> Doner esE' t E_out2<31:B>
Figure 34. Interface of SHA·I design
For the three-implementation trials shown in Table 3. utilization of external lOBs was
194 out of 512 (37 %). The number of slices used for the above architecture was 1446 out
of 12288 (II %). Furthennore there was 10% utilization of three state buffers (fBUFs).
Timing reports of the SHA·I iterative design are suounarized in Table 3. In this table the
critical path delay is the delay for a single iteration.
Table 3. Timing report summary of SHA·I iterative design
Medium High High Effort
Effort Effort with a
Timing
Constraint
Number of slices (% of total) 11% 11% 11%
Number of I/O block. (% of total) 37% 37% 37%
Logic delay (% of Total) 17.9 28.2 37.1
Routing delay (% of total) 82.1 71.8 62.9
Critical path logic levels 24 32 40
Total delay in critical path (ns) 70.917 63.24 52.996
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The routing delay in the critical path has been reduced by 23 % with the use of high effort
and period timing constraint. The use of many core modules and avoiding components
such as barrel shifter are among the reasons for the above achievement
Full Loop Unfolled Architecture
For the simulation, following test suite was used, The test vector is a collection of
English letters and the digest is in hexadecimal,
Test vector: abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijk.ljldmklmnlmnomnopnopq
Expected digest: 84983E441C3BD26E BAAE4AAI F95129E5 E54670Fl
According to the algorithm the padded message in words is:
61626364 62636465 63646566 64656667 65666768 66676869 6768696A
68696A6B 696A686C 6A686C6D 686C6D6E 6C6D6E6F 6D6E6F70
6E6F7071 800000OO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO
OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOO 0000lXl00 OOOOOOOO 000001CO,
The functional simulation results of full loop unrolled architecture are shown in Figure
35. Most of the signal operations are similar to those of the MD5 full loop unrolled
design, The signal "YYYtoXXX" transfers the loaded data from array "YY" to "XX", At
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the end of computation the signal "IMMM 1" which indicates the "Load_done" signal
computation of second block. When the "End_msg" is observed the last chaining variable
is appeared at the output with the asserted "Done" signal. The implementation results are
summarized in Table 4. The slice utilization was 6963 out of 12288 (56%) and lOB
utilization was 194 out of 512 (37 %). There was only 2% use of three state buffers. The
timing simulation showed that the minimum clock period of the design was 25 ns. As in
the MD5 full loop unrolled design, only the loading delay of the ftrst block is affected by
this clock frequency. The loading and computing times are analyzed under performance
analysis in Section 4.3. In this table the critical path delay is the delay for all the 80
steps.
Table 4. Timing report summary of SHA-I full loop unrolled design
Medium High High Effort
Effort Effort with a
Timing
Constraint
Number of slices (% of total) 56% 56% 56%
Number of I/O block (% of total) 37% 37% 37%
Logic delay (% of total) 41 46 51.8
Routing delay (% of total) 59 54 48.2
Critical path logic levels 1136 1263 1337
Total delay in critical path (ns) 1097.3 1009.8 906.2
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4.3 Performance Analysis ofMD5 and SHA-l
The timing analysis and throughput calculation of the three designs can be perfonned as
follows. The two cases with and without the message loading delay are illustrated in
Figure 36 and 37.
With loading delay:
Throughput = (512)1 (T"""'f'UU'+ T/odd) bits/sec
Figure 36. Timing diagram with loading delay
Without loading delay (double buffering dala):
T"""" T~
ILoading21~~~~1 ComputingCV2 ILoadmg4 --I CompuungCV4
..--..... ~ ):
TIo<ld TCOtfIP'4t
Throughput .. (512)1 T"""",," bits/sec
Figure 37. Timing diagram without loading delay
We now discuss the results each design with respect to the timing reports.
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MDS iterative design
The use of two 512·bit RAM modules to double buffer data avoids loading delay. The
minimum clock perioo obtained was 34.68 ns (from Table I). So the loading time and
computation time can be found as follows:
TIM4 = 16 x 34.68 ns '" 554.88 ns
TCOhIf1"U = 64 x 34.68 ns = 2219.5 ns
The expected throughput (from Figure 37) is = (512) /(2219.5 ns)= 230.68 Mbps. In MDS
iterative design the critical path minimum delay is the minimum delay of the clock.
Without the use of dual RAMs the throughput would be 184.5 Mbps (from Figure 36). It
was evident that the use of dual RAMs leads to alm.ost 25% improvement of the timing
perfonnance. The area utilization of this design was considerably smaller (11 % of slices).
The unused area could be used 10 implement several designs in the device and process
multiple messages in parallel as far as the I/O ports can be utilized successfully.
MDS tuu loop unrolled design
For this design the minimum clock period obtained was 14 ns. The minimum delay of the
critical path = 1054.12 ns (from Table 2). The loading and computation times are,
T,.=16x 14 ns =224 ns
T""""",. = 1054.12 ns.
The thrOlfghput with double buffering (from Figure 37) is (512)1(10.54.12 ns) = 48.5.7
Mbps. Without the use of double buffering lhe throughput would be 400.5 Mbps. The
critical delay of this design is the computational time, which is independent of the clock
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period. The use of double buffering has given 21% improvement. In this case the slice
utilization was 39%. Hence it is possible to have two design modules in the same device
and process two different messages in paralleL
SHA-l iterative design
In our design the loading time has not been eliminated. The minimum clock period was
52.996 os (from Table 3). Hence the loading and computation times are,
Tt_= 16 x 52.996 ns = 847.936 os
TCCWIf"'J~ = 80 x 52.996 os = 4239.680s
The expected throughput (from Figure 36) is (512) 1(847.936 + 4239.68ns) = 100.636
Mbps. If the loading delay is eliminated the throughput would be around 120.764 Mbps,
which is a 20 % improvement.
SHA·l Cull loop unrolled design.
The minimum clock period obtained was 25 os and the minimum delay of the critical
path was 906.284 ns (from Table 4). Hence the loading and computation times are,
T'-:I=16x25ns=400ns
T~ = 906.284 ns.
The throughput (from Figure 37) is (512)1(906.284 ns) = 565 Mbps. It would be 391.95
Mbps with the loading delay (from Figure 36). So the double buffering has caused 44%
improvement in throughput, which is significant compared thai of the MD5 design. When
the two full loop unrolled designs are compared, the SHA·l design showed better results.
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The percentage routing delay of the critical palh of full loop unrolled MD5 and SHA-l
were 56.4% and 48.2 % respectively. The device utilization of this design is fairly high
(S6% slices). It is not possible to accommodate more than one design in the same device.
The ability to reduce the routing delay has become a major reason for better
perfonnance of SHA-l over MOS. In MDS full loop unrolled design, the operations of
each step need a unique 32-bit constant that has to be read from a ROM. This ROM that
consists of 64 number of 32-bit words is configured with LUTs. The routing associated
with this operation is tighter than that of SHA-l, which has only four distinct constants.
Therefore the full loop unrolled design of SHA-l could be optimized better than MD5.
However, in iterative design the percentages of routing delays of M05 and SHA·I were
almost the same. Total critical path delay of the iterative core of SHA-l was higher than
that of MOS. This is due to the larger number of logic levels in the iterative core of SHA-
I compared to MOS. Therefore in iterative designs, MDS has better timing than SHA·!.
4.4 HMAC-SHA-llmplementation
HMAC is a keyed message authentication code, which shall be used in
combination with cryptographic hash functions specified in a Federal Infonnation
Processing standard (FIPS) [8]. Let H be the hash function initialized with its fixed Initial
Value, IV, which results in an n·bit hash value. The function HMAC works on inputs m
of arbitrary length. which is a multiple of512 bits. It uses a single random string K as ils
key. If the key length is greater than 512, it is input to the hash function to produce an n-
bit key. The recommended key length is 2: n. The HMAC can be expressed as follows:
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HMACdm) = H(K+ $opad,H(K+ $ipad,m»
where K+ is K, padded with zeros on the left so that the result is 512 bits long, ipad is the
inner pad, which is the byte hex 36 repeated 64 (51218) times and opad is the outer pad,
which is the byle hex 5C repeated 64 times. The symbole denotes the XOR operation.
LeI Ihe input m = 1n(l, ml .. ll4.I. The HMAC block diagram is shown in Figure 38
['8][16].
IV 512 *'~Haan(SHA'l)
I< cpad of
h\~lIml
512
IV --,.----.....-c;---:--.J
Figure 38. HMAC operations
HMAC was developed to fulfill the efficiency and other requirements of the
Internet along with a more rigorous analysis of securil}'. In HMAC [67J, the underlying
hash function is considered as a component lhat can be replaced if it is found to be weak
or when new more efficient or secure hash functions are developed. HMAC has been
9'
chosen as the mandatory-to-implement MAC for IPSEC and is used in other Internet
protocols such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL).
To obtain the MAC there should be minimum of three hash operations. We
choose to investigate the implementation of HMAC using the full loop unroBed SHA-l
core. In the same manner, any arch.iteeture ofSHA.l, or MD5 or other Internet specified
hash algorithm could be used as the underlying hash function.
4.4.1 Design Description
In the HMAC-SHA-l design, the SHA-I core is used to obtain the hash operation.
Similarly it is also possible to use the iterative SHA-l or iterative or full loop unrolled
MD5 as the cryptograph.ic hash function for HMAC. The block diagram of the design is
shown in Figure 39. The full loop unrolled core is a sub module in the MHMAC_SHA-I".
The other main component of the design is the l6-state "HMAC_ state_ machine". The
two counters are used for the same purposes explained under SHA-l implementation.
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''''
HltoXX
CounL e
,- "X In count
CV set
I<--':"~"'=~"':'--+--I HMAC_state1<--'=""--+---1 MachineL_--.._~:f~d:=~=~=t:=~T __f_...,_r_~~~~~=
Figure39. HMAC·SHA-l Block Diagram
An important component in this design is the 16-state HMAC state machine for which the
basic state diagram is given in Figure 40. The "Reset" signal initializes the state machine
and counters. With the "StartM and the "Key_loadM signals asserted, me particular key is
loaded to the "HMAC-SHA-l". Using this key, the initial blocks for the two hash
operations are prepared and stored in two arrays (5 I and 52) after which the first block is
loaded and the computation is started.
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Walt,.dorle
Figure 40. State diagram for HMAC-SHA-I design
During the computation the next block is loaded. The signal "SltoXX~ loads
the next block to the core after the computation. This is continued until the full length of
the message has been processed. When the end of the message is met (~End_msg"), the
resultant hash value is padded so that the length is 512 bits. This is appended to the
second initial value, which has already been created using the key. These two blocks are
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hashed to create the MAC for the message. The "S2toXX" and "HIOXX" signals load the
first and second blocks respectively, at the appropriate states. "SHA_load30unter" is
used to load 16-word blocks to the core. "Xjn_count" is the address of the block words
for loading into and reading from the core. "SHA_wait30unter" counts the time required
for a computation of one CV. The MAC will be presented as four 32·bit outputs,
"A_out", "B_out", "C_out", "o_out" and "E_out". Once the HMAC for a message is
done, if there is no key change, the computation can continue for the next message.
Otherwise a new key can be loaded using "Key_load" signaL The MAC can be chosen as
the complete HMAC result or a pan of that depending on the requirement.
4.4.2 Simulation, Synthesis and Implementation Results.
The simulation, synthesis and implementation of HMAC-SHA-l were performed
using the same design flow applied for implementations of previous designs. The
functional simulation result of the design is shown in Figure 41. The test case used for
this simulation utilizes a 25-byle key and produces a 20-byte HMAC. The test vectors
and the simulation details are as follows;
Test message: CO repeated 50 times.
Key: 0102030405060708090a0bOcOdOeOflOII121314151617l819
The key and the message are loaded when the "New_message" and "Key_load" go high
when the "reset" signal is low. At the end of the key load. "s ltoXX" goes high and the
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array "XX" takes the initial block value, which is the XOR of the extended key and
"ipad", The first chaining variable is calculated using the initial value and the result can
be seen in the registers "interU", "inter22", "inter33" and "inter44". At the end of the
computational time (64 clocks in this case) the signal "YYYtoXXX" goes high loading
the message block into array "XX", AI the end of calculation "S2toXX" becomes high
and the XORed value of the extended key and "opad" is loaded to array "XX", At the end
of this computation "HltoXX" signal becomes high and the padded hash value of the
message is loaded to array "XX", As the "Start" is low, the HMAC value has appeared at
the output.
The design was initially synthesized and implemented with medium effort and
then it was synlhesized several times with high effort and "period" timing constraint.
The design i~terface of HMAC-SHA-l is shown in Figure 42.
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Figure 42. Interface of HMAC·SHA·l design
The PAR results indicate that, in the cases where different efforts and constraints were
used. the slice utilization is 7517 out of 12288 (61 %) and lOB utilization is 229 out of
512 (44%). So the design is well fitted to a single device. According to Table 5 lhe effort
level and period constraint has improved the perfonnance by about 25%.
Table 5. Timing report summary of HMAC·SHA·l design
Medium High Effort High effort & Period
Effort Constraint
Number of Slices (% of total) 61% 61% 61%
Number of YO Blocks 44% 44% 44%
Logic Delay (% of total) 36.4% 45.1% 52%
Rouling Delay (% of total) 63.6% 52% 48%
Logic levels 1113 1235 1305
Total Delay (ns) 1212.9 1021.5 900.5
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4.5 Performance Analysis ofHMAC-SHA-l
The timing diagram for HMAC-SHA-l operation for one single block message is given
in Figure 43.
I loading keyl Processing $1
)(
TI«ld TC<tItIpIdt
ILoading b'kL-.-.-J Computing H1 I Processing 52 IProcessing H2 I
+---+ ~.===::;.~.===::;.~.===~
Tload T~ TcoropIU' Tcampwo
Figure 43. Timing diagram for HMAC-SHA·l operations.
According to Table 5, though timing optimizing has increased the number of logic
levels, it has not affected the slice utilization and routing delay has been reduced
significantly. According to the area utilization, the design can be fitted to a single Virtex
device. The minimum total delay was 900.5 os. The throughput of this depends on the
length of the message. As the length of the message increases the throughput gets closer
to the throughput of in-built SHA-I. Hence if the length of the message is NbU, ,
Throughput'" (NbIl xS12)1«Nbll+ 3) x T"""",,~) bits/sec
From Table 5, TC<IIIlP"4' '" 900.5 os. Therefore,
Throughput: (Nb/lx512)1 ((NIXJ:.+ 3) x 900.5 x 10·~.
For large messages the throughput would be almost as 568 Mbps, which is the throughput
of the underlying SHA-l.
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In the same way. the maximum throughput of HMAC with MD5 (full loop
unrolled) as the underlying hash function can be estimated as (Nw x 512) I «Nblk+ 3) x
1054.12 ns) '" 485 Mbps when NbIk~co.
4.6 Conclusion
The five designs of the three algorithms have been successfully synthesized and
implemented. Each design can be easily fitted into a single Virtex device. Some of the
optimizing methods have been explored to improve the timing perfonnance. The
"Period" constraint has been effective for all the implementations. When a design
comprises components. which can be generated by parameterizing the library
components, the design can be well optimized using the features of the Xilinx tools. This
is because the components are well mapped into the target device and hence the less
amount of logic delay in the total delay of the critical path. The ability to reduce the
routing delay has become a major reason for better performance of SHA-I over MOS.
Due to the reasons mentioned in section 4.3, the full loop unrolled design of SHA-l could
be optimized better than M05. However the total critical path delay of the iterative core
of SHA-I was higher than that of MD5 due to larger number of logic levels in the
iterative core of SHA-l compared to M05. Therefore in iterative designs, MD5 has a
better timing than SHA·!.
The throughput values obtained for the three algorithms can meet most of the
currently available IP bandwidths. Hence, FPGA implementation can be used as
components in cryptographic accelerators for use in IPSEC. The results can be further
105
improved using more constraints, enabling delay based cleanup router passes and
hardware floor planning. The use of latest FPGA devices with more resources and bener
speed performance will also provide better results. These three altogether are widely used
in Internet security. which deals with a large range of message lengths. The size of the
message has a significant impact on the performance of these algorithms. The next
chapter discusses the performance of HMAC and CBC-MAC considering the
characteristics of Internet traffic.
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ChapterS
Performance of MAC Algorithms for IPSEC
The cryptographic algorithms employed in Internet security must be able to
handle packets which may vary in size over a large range. Most of the cryptographic hash
algorithms process messages partitioned into blocks. Due to this fact the messages have
to be prepared by padding the required amount of zero bits to get an imeger number of
blocks. The length of lhe message is also appended at the end. This process becomes a
considerable overhead when the short messages are more dominant in the message
stream. Hence the size of the message has a significant impact on the performance of
such algorithms.
The statistical properties of Internet traffic are complc:t and the amount of data to
be studied is very large. The understanding of Internet traffic is useful to study the
performance of authentication algorithms. In this chapter we will analyze the
perfonnance of HMAC and CDC·MAC in the context of the traffic characteristics of the
Internet.
5.1 Previous Studies of Internet Traffic
Various attempts have been made over the years co study the nature of the wide
area Internet traffic. Many of the studies have used Internel traffic trace dala as inpul to
evaluate specific protocol performance issues but have not concentrated on characterizing
the underlying traffic contained in the traces. Among them Feldmann et al. [67] have
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perfonned a detailed characterization of Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HlTP) response
traffic since the World Wide Web has a dominant influence in network dynamics. Figure
44 highlights the basic traffic characteristics of incoming and outgoing packets obtained
by Feldmann et al. for a one-week trace. According to this study, half of the outgoing
traffic consists of 4O-byte Transport Control Protocol (TCP) acknowledgment packets,
contributing to a low average packet size of 123 bytes. The remaining short packets are
mainly HlTP requests. One-fifth of the incoming packets stem from 4O-byte rcp
acknowledgements. According to this study, more than 60% of the incoming packets
have 552, 576 or 1500 bytes, that correspond to common maximum transfer unit sizes on
the Intemet[67j.
~
" ~ J~]I
" "~
~ ~
.. I~ + Inoarrlng~ X outgoing
~l..,:'------~----~-----,--J
500 1000 1500
packet size pn bytes)
Figure 44. Cumulative distribution of packet sizes [67].
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Several importanl observations have been made by the analyses of aClUal traffic
carried in lhe Internet backbone. The Corporative Association for International Data
Analysis (CAlDA) has perfonned slUdies on backbone traffic characteristics at a site
inside a major Internet traffic exchange point over a period of JO months (68). The !raceS
for lhe sludy were collected from an OC-3 ATM link using an optical splitter. The
distribution of IP packet sizes is shown in Figure 45.
Packets
.
.
Figure 45. Cumulative distribution ofIP packel sizes[69].
According to lhis study, TCP has contributed to about 85% of !he traffic in the
traces. A large portion of TCP traffic has been generated by bulk transfer applications
such as HTIP and FfP. The packet size has been calegorized into three groups namely
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40 byte packets (minimum packet size for TCP), which carry TCP acknowledgments but
no payload, 1500 byte packets (maximum Ethernet payload size) and 552 and 576 byte
packets.fromTCP.
A rule of thumb employed in some of the IP traffic analysis has three packet sizes
each having equal probability of occurrence. They are 40 bytes, 256 bytes and 1500
bYles, each having a probability of occurrence of one third [70].
5.2 IP Packet Size Models
Studying the behavior of IP packet size of the [nternet messages allow the
estimation of actual perfonnance of authentication functions such as HMAC·SHA·l or
CBC-MAC. The average block size can be derived by analyzing the statistical
observations. For analytical purposes the probability density function (PDF) of the IP
packet size will be approximated as one of the following four cases:
Case (i)
PDF ~,----"'-----,~~L
40 1500 Packet size (Bytes)
Figure 46. Unifonn PDF
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Case (ii)
PDF
0.3333 0.3333 0.3333
Case (iii)
Figure 47. Rule-of- thumb of PDF
Packet size (Bytes)
Case (iv)
PDF~O.'
0.3
I
0.2
'-:---_ -,-------_--,'---1_
40 576 1.'500 Packet size (Bytes)
Figure 48. Discrete PDF with 3 impulses
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Figure 49. Discrete and Unifonn PDF
III
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Packet size (Bytes)
Each case has a different degree of accuracy in modeling Internel traffic. Case (i) is the
straightforward assumption of uniformly distributed packet sizes; Case (ii) is a typical
rule-of-thumb; Case (iii) is a better rule-of-thumb; Case (iv) follows most closely Figure
45.
The average number of blocks per packet (n can be obtained as follows. If the
number of blocks of the message of packet size i bytes is Nbfk(i) and the probability of
the message has ibytes isp(l).
r= ~P(i)XNblk(i)
5.3 Performance of MACs in Internet
(5.1)
HMAC·SHA· I has been recommended for message authentication in several
network security protocols. The key reasons behind this are the provable security, free
availability, flexibility of changing the hash function and reasonable speed, among others.
The MAC based on the block ciphers such as cae-MAe-DES [34J was generally
considered as slow due to the complexity of the encryption process. As well, since DES
has already been broken it is not recommended any more. However, after selecting the
AES encryption algorithm, this situation merits reevaluation as Rijndael (49) shows good
perfonnance in both hardware and software and it has better security featUfCs than DES.
CBC-MAC is likely to be standardized as an AES mode of operation. For HMAC one
block has a size of 512 and for CBC-MAC analysis, we assume a block size of 128 bits
(as is the case for AES).
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The CBC-MAC comes in different versions varying in details such as padding,
length variability and key search strengthening [71]. The general way of padding for
CSC·MAC is by considering the final input block as a partial block of data, left justified
with zeroes appended to fonn a full block [34). Let us take the number of blocks of the
message of packet size i bytes for HMAC and CBC-MAC using AES (CBC-MAC-AES)
are NblkMIlC and NblkllES, respectively. According to the padding method described in
Section 2.2.5, NblkMllc can be obtained as follows:
1
rCiX8)/5121+1
Nblk/olAC:
rCiX8)15121
if (iXS)mod512:0 or
(ixS)mod5122:448
if (ixS)mod512<44S
Assuming the general way of padding described above has been adopted for CBC-MAC-
AES.
NblkllES: r(i x 8)11281
5.3.1. Average Number of Blocks per Packet
The average number of blocks per packet of the IP traffic can be estimated
according to the four cases mentioned earlier.
Case (i):
In this case the PDF of the packet size is assumed to be uniformly distributed. From
Figure 46, the average number of bLocks for HMAC can be estimated as follows. From
equation (5.1),
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r", ~[(O.511460)'Nb{kM"'C(j)l
:::6,34.
Therefore the average number of HMAC blocks for this model is 6.34.
Similarly the average number of blocks for CBC·MAC can be estimated as
,~
follows. For 128 bit block Size'I~[Nblk.W'(j)1.71086. Hence from equation (5.1), the
average number of CDC·MAC blocks for a unifonnly distributed packet size, is r :::
24.34.
Case (ii):
This is a rule of thumb used in some performance analyses related to IP traffic. From
Figure 47, the average number of blocks for HMAC can be estimated based on:
NblkMAc (40) ::: I
Nblk/tlAC (256) ::: 5
Nblk/tlAc(1500) ::: 24.
Therefore, the average number of HMAC blocks for the model used as a rule of thumb, is
10. The average number of caC-MAC blocks also can be calculated in the same manner:
NbtkA£S(2S6) ::: 17
NblkAES (1500) ::: 94
Hence, the average number of CMC·MAC blocks for this model is 38.
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Case (iii):
This model has a PDF wilh Ihree impulses as shown in Figure 48. The average number of
blocks for HMAC can be calculated using:
Nblk/.llld40) = I
Nbik/.lllc (576) = 10
Nblk/.lllc(1S00) = 24
Therefore, using (5.1) the average number ofHMAC blocks when the discrele PDP with
3 impulses model is used for the IP packet size. is 8.3. In the same manner the average
number of blocks for CBC-MAC can be estimated by ooting:
Nblkllcs (40) = 3
NbfkllES (576) = 37
Nblkllcs (1500)= 94
Hence, the average number of CBC-MAC blocks for a packet size model with discrete
PDF shown in Figure 48, is 31.4.
Case (iv);
This model closely follows the cumulative distribution given in Figure 45. From Figure
49 the average number of blocks for HlvIAC can be estimated using;
Nblkw.d40) = 1
Nbik/.lllc (552) = 9
Nblkw.c (576) = 10
Nblk,lflld1500) =24
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From equation (5.1), the average number of HMAC blocks can be found as follows:
r = (0.5)(1) + .~[(0.15/(511)' NblkllAc(i)]+ (O.02X9)+ ;%)[(0.005/(23»). NblkllAc(i)J
+ (0. I 15XI0) + 1~(O.06/(923»)' NblkM,Oc(i) + (0.15X24)
Where the summations of the number of blocks can be easily found as shown below:
~,Nblklll.'.c(i)=2687. ;~JNblkMM:(i)=215, i~NblkM,Oc(i)=15558.
Therefore, llIe average number of HMAC blocks willi this model. which closely follows
llIe actual packet distribution is used for lhe IP packet size, is r = 7.28.
In the same manner the average number of blocks for CDC·MAC can be
calculated using:
Nblk~E.d40) = 3
NblkA£S(552) =35
Nblk~ES(576) =37
NblkA£S(1500)=94
From Figure 46 and equation (5.1) lhe average number of CDC-MAC blocks is given by
r: (0.5)(3)+ ~[(0.15/(511»)' Nblk~(m + (0.02X35)+ ~((0.OO5/(23»)' Nblk~@
Hence, llIe average number of CDC·MAC blocks for llIe model, which closely follows
the actual packet distribution, is 27.51.
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5.3.2 Performance in Hardware
The perfonnance of the FPGA implementations of HMAC-SHA-l (using full
loop unrolled results of SHA-l) and CBC-MAC-AES is compared in the four IP traffic
cases previously mentioned. The FPGA implementation results of Rijndael published by
NIST have been used for this analysis. An FPGA implementation of Rijndael has been
carried out using Xilinx Virtelt XCVlOOOBG560-4 device by AJ Elbirt et aI. [51] for the
evaluation of AES finalist algorithms. The clock frequency that has been obtained by
them for the loop unrol1ed architecture in feedback mode is 14.1 MHz. One block has
taken 6 clock cycles and thus a throughput of 300.1 Mbps has been obtained. The delay
for one block encryption is 426.5 ns. However, for comparison purposes the speed grade
of the Virtelt device has to be taken as -6 as with our implementations. The change of
speed grade -4 to -6 gives approximately 28% of speed enhancement [60]. Hence, the
delay for block encryption would approximately be 307.08 os.
The average time for calculating MAC using HMAC and CBC-MAC-AES can be
detennined by the following relationships:
Average HMAC calculation time
'" (3+(r»x{timeforahash] (5.2)
Average CBC·MAC calculation time
'" (r) x[time for a block encryption] (5.3)
The calculated values for HMAC and CBC·MAC·AES using equations (5.2) and (5.3)
are given in Table 6.
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Table 6. Times for HMAC-SHA-I and CBC-MAC-AES on FPGA for general 1P traffic
Case (i) Case (ii) Case (iii) Case(iv)
Average Average Average Average Average Average Average Average
packel packel
_.
-..
-" -" --
po-
size(ln timeUis) slzer~ -..., size (in time(j.l&) size (in 1ime(J.l&)
"""k>' b_' """"" """""
10.18HMAC·
SHA·1
cae-
MAC-
A'S
5.3.3 Performance in Software
Both HMAC-SHA-I and CBC-MAC-AES were run on a 927 MHz Pentium U
machine. The C code which has been used for assessing the speed perfonnance of
Rijndael by NIST [72] was used in CDC mode for CBC-MAC·AES. The plaintext of
128-bit was encrypted 1,000.000 times in CDC mode using a 128·bit key. The average
time for encrypting a 128-bit block was 1.14 ~. The C code of SHA-l published by DI
management {731 according to NIST specifications was used to determine the software
speed of hashing. The average time taken for creating a hash value for a 512-bit block
was 3.001 J.IS.
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Table 7_ Times for HMAC-SHA-l and CBC-MAC-AES on software for generailP traffic
Case (I) Case (Ii) Case (iii) Case(iv)
Average Average Average Average Average Average Average Average
-" -" -" -" -"
packet
-" -"size (in tlme(us) slze(ln """"" stze(ln time{J.Is) slze(ln tlme!J.lS)blocks) -, -, -,
HMAC· 39.01 8.3 33.91 7.28 30.84
SHA-1
cec-
MAC· 24.34 27.75 38 <3.32 31.4 38.80 27.51
A'S
5.4 Conclusion
According to Table 6 the average times of MAC calculations of the FPGA
implementations of HMAC and CBC·MAC·AES do not differ significantly. Particularly,
they are almost the same as the size of the packets becomes larger.
The software results given in Table 7 show that the liming perfonnances of
HMAC-SHA-I and CBC-MAC-AES do not have a significant difference. As observed in
FPGA implementations HMAC offers better timing performance as me packets become
larger. In general, the size of the packet has a considerable impact on the performance of
cryptographic hash algorithms as the padding has to be carried out all the time even if me
message has a length of multiples of 512 bits. TIlis becomes a large overhead for small
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packets especially in case of HMAC algorithm. Most of today's cryptographic algorithms
follow a sequential structure, which is difficult to pipeline. Many of them cannOI meet
loday's speed requirements. Hence the new approaches of hash algorithms. which are
more efficient in speed, have to be explored. The next chapler discusses one of the new
approaches in message authentication.
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Chapter 6
A New Approach: Universal Message Authentication Code
For many applications sufficient speed has already been obtained from algorithms
such as HMAC-SHA-I [67] or CBe-MAC of a block cipher (33]. However for the most
speed demanding applications some alternative methods have to be identified. The well
known technique for message authentication using universal hash functions seems to be
very promising as it provides schemes that are both efficient and provably secure: under
reasonable assumptions [74]. During the last few years. progress has been made both in
theory and practice of universal hash functions. For example, Universal Message
Authentication Code (UMAC), a non-cryptographic hash algorithm has been developed.
This does not need to have any cryptographic hardness property but some combinatorial
properties that can be proved [46]. Halevi and Krawczyk have developed a very fast
scheme, multi-linear modular hashing (MMH) which makes optimal use of multiply and
accumulate instructions of the Pentium MMX processor [45] which provide small-scale
single instruction multiple data (SIMD) parallelism in its instruction set.
Recently, Back et aI. have further improved the performance on high-end
processors with Universal Message Authentication Code (UMAC) construction, which is
faster than MMH on processors with fast multiplication [46]. The authors of UMAC
report a software performance of 5.6 G bits/sec on a 350 MHz Pentium II. In this chapter
the structure and the complexity of the UMAC algorithm, in tenns of hardware
implementation, are discussed.
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6.1 UMAC Construction
UMAC is a parameterized algorithm. Various low level choices nave not been
fixed. The values for these parameters are chosen before the authentication generated by
UMAC becomes well defined. Hence instead of making generic compromises, an
application that uses UMAC can choose the parameters which best suit its requirements
or implementation environment. There are two sets of parameters chosen as UMAC-16
and UMAC-32. UMAC-16 is designed to exploit small-scale SIMD parallelism found in
modem processors and UMAC·32 is designed to do well on processors with good 32·bit
and 64-bit support. There are six basic parameters as given below.
Word length:
UMAC output length:
Block length:
UMAC key length:
Endian Favorite;
Operations sign:
The size of word in' bytes can be eilher 2 or 4 bytes.
UMAC·32 uses 4 bytes.
Specifies the length of the authentication tag in bytes. It can
be any value between 1and 32 bytes. The default value is 8
bytes.
Specifies the message block length in bytes. which can be
any value between 32 and 228 bytes. The default value is
1024 bytes.
Specifies the user supplied key 1engtlt in bytes. This can be
either 16 or 32 bytes. The default value is 16 bytes.
Specifies which endian orientation is used in reading data.
Specifies whether string operations are signed or unsigned.
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Moreover UMAC offers a tradeoff between forging probability and speed, which
is not common in the construction of other authentication algorithms. UMAC also enjoys
better analytical security properties than the existing authentication algorithms.
The overview of UMAC operation is as follows. The message to be authenticated
is first applied to the universal hash function (UHASH) resulting in a string, which is
much shorter than the original message. The UHASH has three layers, which use
different sizes of keys. The keys have to be derived from the shared key through a pseudo
random function (PRF). The same PRF is used for the tag generation. The PRF is applied
to a nonce and the authentication tag is the logical xor of the two outputs of the hash
function and the pseudorandom function. The nonce is a parameter such as a counter that
varies with time. It is widely applied in key management protocols to prevent message
replay and other types of attacks. The authentication tag is generated as
tag =j(nonce) XOR h (message)
where j is the pseudorandom function and h is the universal hash function shared by the
sender and the receiver. The sender does not reuse the nonce under the same MAC key.
Typically the nonce would be incremented using a counter with each message. UMAC
defines the creation of authentication tag using the message, shared key and nonce. The
receiver can recompute the tag using the received message and nonce to see the
authenticity. A shared key is used to key the PRF,j, to generate all of the pseudorandom
bits required by the layers of the universal hash function. Therefore the j is used for
generating both the tag and all of the pseudorandom bits used in the algorithm [75].
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6.1.1 UMAC Key Derivation
The user-supplied key is expanded into the internal keys using the key selUp
process. The lotal keys needed for all ilerations are found by repeating this process until
the required key lengths are achieved. Key setup can be carried oul using a block cipher
or some cryptographic hash function. Example block ciphers ace Rijndael, DES, RC6 and
MARS. Examples of hash funclions ace HMAC·SHA·l, SHA-I, MD5 and RIPEMD-l60
[46]. The Internet draft of UMAC (75] describes me key derivation using AES block
cipher (Rijndael) in output feedback mode to produce pseudorandom bits needed within
universal hashing. Depending on the size of me user supplied key me 128-bit and 256-bit
block length variants of AES cipher are used. An index is used so that using the same key
different pseudorandom outputs can be generated wim different indices.
6.1.2 Tag Generation
The output of the universal hash function is XORed with a pseudorandom string
to produce the tag. The pseudorandom string is generated by applying AES block cipher
to a nonce. The nonce can be 1 to 16 bytes of length but all nonces in a single session
should be of equal lengm. AES may provide more or fewer bits per invocation than are
needed for me tag generation. Then one part of the AES output could be used to generate
one tag and the other part could be used for the tag of the next message. This
optimization is effective only when the nonees are sequential. The low bits of the nonce
are used as an index into the AES output, which is generated using higher bits of the
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nonce. which are not used for indexing. If the UMAC output is larger than 16. then two
AES invocations are required to produce sufficiem number of bits [75].
6.1.3 Universal Hash Function (UHASH)
UHASH is the keyed hash function, which takes a message of an arbitrary length
and produces a string of fixed length (e.g. 8 bytes). This has been constructed in three
layers.
I. Non-linear hash (NH) compresses input messages into strings, which are typically
many times smaller than the input messages.
2. The compressed message is hashed with an optimized "polynomial hash function"
into a fixed length of 16-byte string.
3. The 16·byte string is hashed using "inner product flash" into a string of length 2
or 4 bytes, which is repeated to the appropriate tag length.
Figure 50 shows the generic interface of UMAC for 32-bit operation.
Message Key
Figure 50. Interface of UHASH
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Figure 51 shows the structure of UMAC diagranunatically. This diagram represents one
of the applications of UMAC in 32-bit architecture. Here the block length on which the
hash function inilially operates is 1024 bytes.
~!,,--~.:,c:----.~ Layer3 keyl KL3.Uo,1
L.J"""'t-----..J '\-bytes Layer3 key2 KL3_2~1 0,1
8-bytes f
P ~6-"KAESCipher8-byzes 8-bytes L-"(RI<11U>md"',.clCJ)'--J.....,~ Nonce1- 16l1ytes
T.g
Figure 51. General structure of UMAC
In the figure, I is the number of blocks in the message. In this case the Ihtee layers have
10 be run twice with different sel of keys 10 get the required 8 byles output (shown in
dotted lines). For the tag generation, half of the AES output bits could be used and the
second half of the same could be used for the tag of the nexi message. This optimization
is effective only when nonces are sequential.
These three layers are repealed with a modified key until the required output
length is obtained. Since this repetition is independent, each word of the final output can
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be computed independently. Hence computing a prefix of the tag can be done
significantly faster than computing the whole tag. If the message being hashed is no
longer than 1024 bytes (for the case shown in Figure 51), then Layer 2 hashing is skipped
as an optimization. To reduce memory requirements the first and the third layers reuse
most of their key material between iterations. The values used for the UMAC parameters
in following description are related to UMAC-32 construction.
Layer 1: Nonlinear Hashing (NIl)
This is designed to be fast on modem processors. NH hashes an input string M
using a key K and perfonning a sequence of arithmetic operations. There are two
versions, NH-16 and NH~32 depending on the word length parameter of UMAC.
Consider a message M = Mn. MI. ..Mt where MIE {0•..232_1}. In order to limit the length
of key required in the first layer. the message is broken up into chunks no longer than the
key length of Layer I. Each chunk is hashed with a key of the same length. NH-32 is
constructed using a sequence of n <!: I 32-bit sub keys derived from the shared key K. The
Layer 1 keys are represented as KLl= (Ko. ..K,.).
'"NHK,,(M)= fr{[(M lI- 1 +K1H )mod2J1 X(M 1f +K lI)mod2l2 l}mod26ot
Here the operations are 32-bit and 64-bit addition and 32-bit multiplication. These are
modular operations on 232 and 264• Figure 52 shows the NH-32 construction for 256-bit
message string. All the string sizes are given in bytes.
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Figure 52. NH·32 construction for 256-bit message string
The input message is broken into chunks of Block length bytes (e.g. 1024 bytes).
The lasl block is zero padded to an appropriate length. Then each chunk is hashed wi!h
NH and !he oulputs from all !he invocations are annolated with g·byte leng!h information
of !he message block. This produces the Layer 1output (ft) as shown in Figure 53.
Figure 53. UHASH Layer 1
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With respect to hardware implementation, the major operations involved in Layer I are
!he 32·bit addition in modulo 232• 64-bit addition in modulo 2M and 32-bit multiplication
in modulo 2M . The complexity is discussed in Section 6.2.
Layer 2: Polynomial bashing.
TIle overview of Layer 2 is shown in Figure 54.
I MeSSagj string or!~~~~~~~~~~=:~~toutput) I
Yl
Figure 54. UHASH Layer 2
The output of Layer 1 hashing is still has a considerable length (16 x (number of
message b"tocks) bytes). Polynomial hashing is used to reduce this to a fixed length of 16
bytes. In this hashing the input string of bits is treated as a sequence of coefficients of a
polynomial and the hash key is the point at which the polynomial is evaluated. The
security assured by polynomial hashing degrades linearly in the length of the message
being hashed. The collision probability of two messages of n words in polynomial
hashing with a prime modulus p is DO more than nip [75). There should be some way to
ensure the collision probability does not increase beyond a certain limit. By dynamically
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increasing the prime modulus used in polynomial hash.ing the collision probabilily bound
is aChieved.
As Layer I produces quite long strings and the security guarantee of polynomial
hashing degrades linearly, some scheme is required to allow long strings while ensuring
that the colHsion probability never grows beyond a certain preset value. However,
polynomial h.ashing under a small prime modulus is faster than hashing under a larger
one. Hence the prime modulus is increased according 10 a preset value so that shalt
messages are hashed faster still accommodating long ones [75]. In UMAC·32 if the
length of the message is S. 217 bytes, then only the prime number (2M -59) is used for
hashing. Otherwise the first 217 bytes are hashed under (264 -59) and remainder under
(i 28 -159). A 24-byte Layer 2 key (Ku) is utilized 10 obtain two keys of 8 bytes and 16
bytes, which are required, in polynomial hashing under prime numbers (264 -59) and (2 128
-159) respectively. For this purpose two 8-byte and 16-byte masking values are used.
Jqy, ::: (KulL8] ) AND (B-byte Mask)
k128 = (KI..2[9..24) ) AND (I6-byte Mask)
The polynomial hashing algorithm takes a string of bits of length divisible by 4
bytes, the prime number (P), the integer value of key k (which can be either Jqy, or kl28)
and an integer (maxrange) to adjust the word strings so thai their values are always less
than the prime number and produces an integer in the range of [0 ... p-l]. Any word
larger than maxrange is split into two words and guaranteed to be in the range, The
maxrange would be either 59 or 159 depending on whether the prime number is (264 _
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59) or (2 128 -159), respectively. The input word string size can be either 8 bytes or 16
bytes and accordingly the prime numbers are chosen.
If the integer values of each 8·byte (or 16-byte) inpU! word string are ml. m2•
.. .mn then the output f2 would be
f2= 1;
For i=l ton
If(mj~maxrange)then
Yl = (kx f2 + (P-I)) modp
Yl = (kx f2 + (mj- (264 -p))) modp
else
Return Yl
The operations in Layer 2 are somewhat complex. The main operations that have
10 be considered in hardware implementation are multiplication between 64-bil and 128-
bit numbers in modulo (264 - 59), multiplication of two 128-bit numbers in modulo (2128
- 159), 64 and 128-bit addition, and logical AND operation. The details are discussed in
section 6.2.
Layer 3: Inner Product Hashing
The 16·bit output of Layer 2 is hashed into a 4-byte result using a simple inner
product hash with affine U'aIlslation. The prime modulus of (236 -5) is used to improve
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security [75}. Two keys, KLj./ and KLj.2, of length 64 bytes and 4 bytes respectively, are
used for the inner product. The 16·byte input and 64·byte key (KL3-I) are broken into 8
chunks as follows. Here M1and k1will be 2 and 8 bytes respectively.
Fori= I t08
Mi=M[(i·l)x 2 + 1, , ix2]
ki=KLj.l [(i-l)x8+ 1, , ix8]
The inner product hashing is defined as follows.
Y3 '" ([{(M X kl + ...+ Maxka) mod (236-5)J mod 212JJ XOR KL3-2
Since layer 3 output is only 4 bytes long, multiple iterations of the three layers are used
with different keys each time until the lIMAC output length is obtained. For example, in
32·bit implementation UHASH has to be done twice to get 8-byte output. Figure 55
shows the Layer 3 input and output details.
Figure 55. UHASH Layer 3
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Layer 3 has multiplications between 16-bit and 64-bit numbers in modulo 232 and
modulus operation on prime number (236 -5) as major operations. In addition to those the
trivial operations such as mod 232 and logical XOR operation are also involved.
6.2 Hardware complexity of UMAC
UMAC has primarily been targeted for software implementation. Most of the
operations have been structured to suit some enhanced architectural features of modem
processors. However, due to the attractive features such as the ability to trade off speed
and security and the flexibility, it is worthwhile studying the suitability of UMAC for
hardware implementation. The operations of each layer are summarized in Table 8.
The block length in bytes gives the minimum storage required during run time
environment for the UMAC internal keys. UMAC has been designed to allow
implementations which accorrunodate "on-line" authentication where the pieces of the
message may be presented to UMAC at different times (but in correct order) and an on-
line implementation will be able to process the message correctly without the need to
buffer more than a few dozen bytes of the message.
Operations involved in Layer I are straightforward in hardware except the 32-bit
multiplication. The Layer I has to be repeated until the full length of the message is
hashed. The throughput of this layer can be easily improved by pipelining.
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Table 8. Main operations in the three layers of UHASH.
32 bit addition (mod 2 )
64-bit addition
32-bit multiplication (mod 2')
l28-bil X 64-bil multiplication
l28-bit X l28-bil mUltiplication (for long messages)
Modulo (2 .59)
Modulo (2'''11_ 159) (for long messages)
Logical AND or XQR
128·bitaddition
Modulo (2 -5)
l6-bit)( 64-bit multiplication
Layer I Layer 2 Layer 3
"
" "
"
"
"
"
"
" "
"
"
"
In Layer 2 there is 128-bit multiplication, which could be expensive in tenns of
speed. In Layer 3 too there are 16-bit and 36-bit multiplications. The other operations are
not critical in terms of the speed. The modulo 232 or 2604 can be easily implemented by
merely ignoring any bits beyond the least significant 32 or 64, respectively. The modulus
operations under a prime number as p such as (264_59) can be implemented without
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division in following manner. Consider X as a number larger than 64 bits, which can be
represented as
X=a2M +b
In the field of the prime number p (which is (i'4-59»,
2S4 -59 = O. hence
Xmodp=b+59a
Hence, it is possible to carry out these modular operations without any division.
With respect to the area U1i1ization of the UMAC, it is useful to consider the
possible area consumption of !he components !hat would be inslantiated by the
implementation. When a high end FPGA device such as Virtex VlOOOFG680 is targeted,
the area utilizations (without optimization) of some major components are as follows.
Here !he percentage of slice utilization for each component is given.
Component
32 - bit addition (mod 232)
64-bit addition (mod 2M )
32-bitmultiplication
128·bit x 64-bil multiplier
128-bit x 12S-bit multiplier
Modulo (2M_59)
Modulo (2 128_159)
Modulo (2J6_5)
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% Slice Utilization
0.13%
0.26%
4.4%
8%
34.20%
1.20%
2.97%
0.46%
16·bit)( 64-bit multiplier
12B-bitaddition
Logical AND
Logical XOR (16 bit)
4.03 %
0.52%
«1 %
«I %
The most expensive operation of the algorithm is the 128-bit multiplication which
is carried out for messages of length> 217• Xilinx core generator library modules were
parameterized to create 32·bit and 64-bit addition and 32·bit multiplication. The other
operations were coded in VHDL to be implemented using the device resources. TIle
throughput of the algorithm can be improved by introducing both parallel operations and
pipelining. Since the operations of different message blocks are independent, it is
possible to perfonn them in parallel by avoiding resource sharing. Layer 1 operations
can be ea'sily pipelined to improve the throughput In this case some of the device
resources have to be allocated for pipelining. This implies that the device will be fully
utilized for UMAC hash operation. The key generation employs Rijndael. which has an
area utilization of the 43 % of slices [51). This has to be implemented separately. The
evaluation of the hardware speed requires a full implementation of the design, which is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.3 Conclusion
The UMAC is a complicated algorithm for hardware implementation. An efficient
(fast) implementation in hardware could be very expensive in terms of complexity and
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thus the FPGA device required. Although the algorithm can be pipelined and the
operations are parallelizable. those advantages cannot be easily achieved with the
constraints of the device resources in many of the teday's popular FPGA devices.
Although it might be implemented on a large FPGA device or using ASIC technology.
the most critical operations have to be fully optimized to improve the throughput. This
again could increase the resource utilization. However. because of the novel features and
the efficiency in soflware, it is worthwhile to study the ways of adopting UMAC for
hardware implementation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In many commercial applications protecting the integrity of infonnation is even
more important than its secrecy. With the advent of public key cryptography, digital
signature schemes and Internet security schemes, cryptographic hash functions have
gained much more prominence. In many applications the perfonnance of cryptographic
operations is a crucial factor, as it often becomes a bottleneck. As well. many security
services handle a large number of security associations. Therefore key agility and
algorithm agility are important issues in this context. He~, in high-speed applications
that employ the above-mentioned schemes, hardware encryption and authentication have
become essential to meet these perfonnance requirements. When these factors are
considered. FPGA devices are a promising alternative for implementing cryptographic
algorithms. In this study, two of the most conunon cryptographic hash algorithms and a
hashed message authentication algorithm were implemented using FPGAs. Two
hardware architectures, iterative and full loop unrolling, were investigated and efforts
were taken to optimize the perfonnance results of the designs. Some of the new
techniques of message authentication were also investigated. In this chapter, the summary
of this thesis, the conclusion and suggested future work arc discussed.
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7.1 Summary and Conclusions of the Study
The background of this research, which motivated towards this study, was first
discussed. After a brief overview of IPSEC, which is the main area of application of
MDS, SHA-l and HMAC, different constructions of hash functions and message
authentication codes were investigated. Some of the constructions, which are more
suitable for hardware implementation, were also discussed. Followed by the descriptions
of the constructions of MD5, SHA-l and HMAC, the main issues related to hardware
implementation were explored. In particular the overview of FPGAs and their
applications were discussed. As the FPGA technology is a growing area that has a
potential to provide perfonnance benefits of ASICS: and the flexibility of processors, it
was selected as the target device (or these implementations. FPGAs allow application
specific hardware circuits to be created on demand to meet the requirements of a design.
Moreover these hardware circuits can be dynamically modified partially or completely in
time and space.
For both MD5 and SHA·l implementations, two architectures were used: the
iterative and full loop unrolled. As expected the iterative design provided the most area-
optimized solution whereas the full loop unrolled design offered the most speed
optimized solution. MD5 iterative design with double buffering offered about 185 Mbps
throughput. High efforts in synthesizing and implementation were used along with
"period" timing constraint for optimum speed results. As the area utilization was
significantly low, several designs could be implemented on the same device and process
multiple messages in parallel with proper management of va ports. The full loop
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unrolled design of MDS, which was also implemented with double buffering and the
same optimizing parameters. gave a throughput of 486 Mbps. According to the area
utilization, at least two design modules could be accommodated in the device and process
two messages in parallel.
SHA·I full loop unrolled design with double buffering gave a throughput of S6S
Mbps. As the area utilization was fairly high only one design can be filted into a single
device. The iterative design of SHA·J showed a throughput of 121 Mbps. In this design
the usage of memory was considerably high and the design is more complex than MDS.
The HMAC was implemented using SHA·I full loop unrolled design as the base
hash function. The maximum throughput obtained was 48.5 Mbps. As a consequence of
these implementations, it was evident that the FPGAs were suitable to implement hash
algorithms and hash based message authentication codes. The perfonnance results meet
some of the currenlly available IP bandwidths. Hence. these FPGA implementations can
be used as components in cryptographic accelerators for use in IPSEC and other
applications.
The size of the message has a considerable impact on the performance of
cryptographic hash algorithms as padding has to be carried out all the time even if the
message has a length of multiples of 512 bits. This becomes a large overhead for small
messages especially in case of HMAC algorithm. As the Internet is one of the main areas
of application of cryptographic hash functions, the understanding of Internet traffic is
useful to study the perfonnance of authentication algorithms. This was investigated using
four traffic models. According to these models the average times of MAC calculations of
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the FPGA implementations of HMAC and CBC-MAC-AES did not differ significantly.
Particularly, the average times were almost the same as the size of the messages became
larger. The software results showed that the timing perfonnances of HMAC-SHA-I and
CBC·MAC·AES did not have a significant difference. As observed in FPGA
implementations HMAC offers better timing perfonnance as the message becomes larger.
As most of today's cryptographic algorithms follow a sequential structure,
pipelining cannot be adopted to optimize the throughput. Hence, many of them cannot
meet today's high-speed requirements. A recently reponed approach that addresses this
issue was then investigated. The universal message authentication algorithm that has been
proposed by researchers was analyzed for hardware perfonnance. It was shown that the
complexity of the algorithm causes high resource utilization, and it would not be feasible
for hardware implementation using existing FPGA devices.
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work
According to the area utilization of M05, several design modules could be
accommodated in the same device and process multiple messages in parallel. This would
be an interesting effort for further investigation. In these implementations only the
"period" timing constraint was used. This constraint covers only timing paths that stan
and end at. a flip-flop, latch or synchronous RAM, which is clocked by a referenced net. It
does not cover paths to output pads. By using other constraintS such as "offset" it might
be possible to improve the perfonnance further. Therefore, implementation trials with
other timing constraints are recommended. The use of a more recently introduced FPGA
141
device would also enhance me timing perfonnance. However, as me structure of MD5
and SHA-I does not allow parallelization, it is hard to achieve high mroughput results.
Two possible alternatives will be eimer to modify the general scructure of cryptographic
hash algorithms or to go for paraJlelizable hash algoritltms with operations tltat are
suitable for hardware implementation.
For the fonner alternative, several metltods have been suggested by other
researchers. One such methods is to use interleaved block chained digest structure. This
replaces the original linear block chain with a finite number of block chains. A pre-
determined finite number of chains are processed from independent initial values, such
that the j~ block is part of the "j mod It,u, chain. The resulting sequence of k digests forms
another message, which can be hashed as a single block. There are several other
proposals, which support parallelism in the general structure of the cryptographic hash
algorithms. However, these proposals need further analysis for their security properties.
For the latter option, some of the members of the universal hash function family
that have suitable properties for hardware implementation could be utilized. These have
to be further investigated for the optimum hardware implementations as well as the
optimum cryptographic properties. Though the proposed UMAC would be 100 large for
the existing FPGA devices, it may be suitable for ASIC implementation. The complete
implementation of UMAC on hardware is recommended so as 10 investigate its speed
perfonnance.
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Appendix A
Results of Timing Simulation with Back Annotation.
This appendix shows the timing simulation results of MDS. SHA-I and HMAC-
sha-l. For this the Standard Delay Fonnal (SOF) fLie which is created during the
implementation is used. The SOF file contains the timing details of the design that have
to be used during the back: annotation. This has to be invoked with the timing simulation
model. The timing simulation model (VHDL file) is created from the Native Generic
Database (NOD) file by running NGD2VHDL. The same test benches utilized for
behavioral and functional simulation were used.
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AppendixB
This appendix gives the read and write operations of the RAM set up during the
80 steps of SHA-l iterative design. During the loading lime, the message block is written
in all the 8 RAM modules. Then the read and write operations of each RAM module vary
according to Table AI. The RAM set up for this is given in Figure 25. While reading lhe
initial 16 words, the next words (17lh word and onwards) can be calculated by XQRing
four words from the previous 16 words together. In this case four words have to be read
at a time and the calculated word has to be stored in a suitable RAM to prevent any clash
between read and write operations among the modules in future steps. The notations
used in the table are as follows.
ReadX Reading the word for step X.
R# Reading memory address # of a RAM to calculate a future word.
W# Writing of a calculated word at memory location 1# of a selected RAM
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......_A FlAlICS RAM_B1 RAM_A2 ......_"' ......_.. 1'1.....'-83
-'"
16 R2 A13 16 A.
".." A3 17 17 AI' A'
-
A. A" 18 18 A15
, A16 , All 19 19
.... AU A12 •
"'" """
A18 7 A13 W21
read6 19 • "
22
w" read7 23 0 , A15
...,. A16 2' 2' R21 A"
"'"
All AU R22
" '"
readl0 A" A16 28
11 "'3 R2. readll 19 ""'7 11m
12
..." A25 A"
"13 29 _13 R28 15 1
"
WOO 30 Readl<4 "'7 ,. R22
15
'"
31 A17 W31 R28
"
...16 . 32
"
R29
17 4417 A25 W33 19
16 A31 Read18 R28 W34 A20
19 R21 35 read19 A27 35
20 R22 A33
"""'"
R28 IN.1e
21 37 ,••,r"
22 36 A35
""""23 -, A31 39 A25 IN39
""24 7 ""'. A32 .. R28
25 -, 41
"
. A39 ~- A34 '"27 A29 A40 ~.,'!7 A35
"
"
~ A30 ",1 _8 A38
"
7 A42
30 ~ ... A32 R43
31 A39 A44
J2 Aead32
33 "" .. A41 ~.d33 ... ...
34 A36 A<2 ~- 7 50
" '"
50
""
....
36 read36
"
A4'
37 A45 A50 ~4437 A39
36
"
A45 ,
" "
A52 1 7
"""".. A42 ~.d40 A47 ...
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51 RAM A -
-"
-, -., RAM B1 RAIICB2 'AM .., RAM 83
41"" A43 read41 A43
"
55 ~'" A50 5743
""
,.."" A" R56 58
.. 59 A52 read44 A.. A57
.. A41 A58
46 59 ~_6
"
R55 52 A60 ,-,
"
A61 50 A58
43 64 A62 A" A57 ffl_'
50 A63 52 ,58d6Q A59
"
'63 ,..,,,
52 "" ,58d52 A60 A55 67
63
""'"
, 56 56
64 ,,,ad~ A62 A58 A67
55 63 W70 57 68
56 , A69 -.. 58
57wn A59 A70 A55 ~.'57
58 An 3 A60 ",.'58
59 Rn
--
, it", 67
60 73 A62 -00 5 68
"
read61 . ,
62 64 ffl'''' 70 7563 n
"
,
64
"
n read64 A68 Iti79
55 ffl""
55
67 ,..<167
68 ,.....
69 ""'69
70 ffl.'70
n
72
73 ~0d73
74 read74
75 ,••'75
" ~"'"n ~dn
78 read78
read79
Table BI. Read and write operations of the RAM sel up of SHA-l iterative design
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